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"Public Use" and the Original




[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation ....
-U.S. Constitution, Amendment V
Introduction
Over the years, both state and local governments have attempted
to use the power of eminent domain to encourage economically
desirable activity. These efforts include expropriations of property to
allow for the construction of a wide array of economic facilities.
Eminent domain has thus been used to acquire land for the building
of manufacturing plants, office complexes,2 shopping centers, and
casinos.4 In fact, eminent domain has been used to support almost
every conceivable type of economic development project. Indeed, in
one of the more extreme examples of takings for economic purposes,
a California court once held that the City of Oakland might use the
* Assistant Dean, George Washington University Law School. B.Th. (McGill); J.D.
(Boston); SJ.D. (Pennsylvania).
1. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)
(transfer of condemned land to build plant for General Motors).
2. Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of New York Auth., 190 N.E.2d 402, (N.Y.
1963) (condemnation of private land by public authority for building of office complex and
railroad station to be operated by private commercial entities).
3. People ex reL City of Urbana v. Paley, 368 N.E.2d 915 (IlN. 1977) (transfer of land
to private developer to build shopping center and commercial offices).
4. Casino Reinv. Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)
(rejecting condemnation for benefit of casino operator).
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power of eminent domain to acquire and sell a National Football
League franchise.5
Opposition to the use of eminent domain for economic
development has become more widespread as the number and scope
of such takings have expanded.6 An increasing number of property
owners and legal theorists have opposed takings for economic
development on the grounds that they are not for a "public use" as
that term is used in the Constitution's so-called Takings Clause. In so
doing, they argue that the term, "public use," as contained in the Fifth
Amendment was intended to operate as a substantive limit on the
scope and nature of government takings. Thus, they urge courts to
invalidate takings involving the transfer of property from one private
party to another on the grounds that such takings are not for a
"public use."7 Other commentators, recognizing that the "public use"
doctrine has long been fraught with confusion, have put forth more
creative arguments in opposition. They argue that economic
expropriations raise problems of rent seeking or abuse of the
legislative process, and they urge courts to apply a strict scrutiny
analysis when the power of eminent domain is used to transfer
property from one private party to another.8
At bottom, however, most of the debate over the use of eminent
domain for economic development-and indeed, much of the debate
about the use of eminent domain in general-revolves around the
question of when courts are empowered to strike down statutes
authorizing a particular taking. That is to say, much of the debate
over the use of eminent domain for economic development is
centered on the question of whether a taking is for a "public use" or
whether it results in an arbitrary taking of property from one private
individual simply to benefit another.
The problem with the various approaches to eminent domain is
that they are based on a misconception about the nature of the
power. Over the years, courts have often looked to the writings of
the seventeenth century civil law theorists to find some basis for
exercising judicial review of legislative expropriations. Nineteenth
5. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835 (Cal. 1982).
6. See, e.g., Dana Berliner & Scott Bullock, Eminent Domain Abuses Unchecked,
WASH. TIMES, March 4, 2002, at A16 (detailing complaints about the use of eminent
domain for economic development).
7. See, e.g., id.
8. See, e.g., Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for
Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50
SYRACUSE L. REv. 285 (2000); Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent
Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 49
(1998) (arguing for a public choice approach); Lawrence Berger, The Public Use
Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REv. 203 (1978) (arguing for an economic
analysis of public use).
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century courts, in particular, relied on the works of Hugo Grotius,
Samuel Pufendorf, and others, and asserted that the use of eminent
domain was limited to cases of "public good" or "public necessity."
The result has been the gradual incorporation of a "public use"
requirement into the Fifth Amendment. Reliance on this public use
requirement has created problems of its own, however, as courts and
commentators have struggled to define precisely what is and is not a
"public use."
The traditional commentators have been looking in the wrong
place, however. As this article will show, the idea that courts had the
power to supervise legislative expropriations would have been
unfamiliar to the members of the Congress who drafted the so-called
Takings Clause. On the contrary, the members of the founding
generation generally understood that the power to take property for
public use is reserved to the legislature alone and is a function of the
principle of consent inherent in a representative government. For, in
taking property, the legislature does not deprive an owner of his
property against his will. Rather, it acts for the owner, giving his
consent to the use of his property for some greater public purpose. In
fact, the power of expropriation is akin to the power to tax. Both
require the consent of the citizenry which makes a gift of a portion of
its property for some public purpose. Indeed, when it comes to
legislative expropriation, the term "taking" is a misnomer. The term
"giving" is a more appropriate description.
The origins of the power of eminent domain are to be found in
the long struggle for legislative supremacy which marked the history
of relations between Crown and Parliament, and which culminated in
the American Revolution. From a very early date, English law
prevented the Crown from divesting a subject of title to property,
even when necessary for a public use. Parliament alone had the
power to expropriate land, and it did so exercising its right to consent
on behalf of the estates of the realm. American political theorists
drew on this legal heritage. In the colonial and revolutionary periods,
Americans repeatedly declared that the power to expropriate private
property for a public purpose rested in the legislature alone. More
importantly, American legislatures repeatedly used their power of
expropriation to effect all manner of social and economic
engineering, frequently transferring property from one private entity
to another where it was thought that the transfer would effect some
greater economic purpose. Having vested their assemblies with the
power to expropriate property for public use, therefore, American
political and legal theory left little room for supervision by the
judicial branch. For, to challenge the means by which legislative
consent was given is to challenge the representative nature of the
legislature itself.
The so-called "takings clause" of the Fifth Amendment
incorporates this understanding of the power of expropriation. In
drafting the clause, James Madison and the members of the first
Congress drew upon the principle of legislative consent to ensure that
private property would be safe from expropriation by the executive.
At the same time, however, they did not attempt to limit the power of
the legislature aside from the requirement that an owner receive
some compensation when divested of his property. Beyond this
limitation, the Congress-exercising its right to consent on behalf of
the citizenry-might expropriate property on any terms it saw fit.
As a result, the U.S. Constitution simply does not contain a
"takings clause" to the extent that such a clause is thought to be
either a grant of power to expropriate property or a substantive limit.
On the contrary, that which is commonly thought to be a takings
clause is in fact nothing more than a compensation clause. In other
words, the Fifth Amendment is not a grant of power to expropriate.
Congress, as a representative body already possessed the power to
give the citizenry's consent to the expropriation of its property before
the clause was drafted.
More importantly, the so-called "public use" limitation on
takings is a contrivance of relatively recent origin. In using the term
"public use" in the Fifth Amendment, the drafters did not intend to
impose a substantive limit on congressional expropriations. Rather,
they intended to distinguish a certain type of taking which required
compensation (expropriations) from those which did not (taxes and
forfeitures). In essence, the drafters merely intended to ensure that
compensation was given when a citizen was called upon to contribute
more than his fair share to support the government. Thus, takings by
expropriation required compensation, while takings by taxation
would not. To reiterate, if read properly, the expropriation clause of
the Fifth Amendment is nothing more than a compensation clause.
Consequently, efforts to use the term "public use" to limit the power
of Congress to expropriate land are illegitimate and are a misreading
of the drafters' intent.
This article will show that efforts to find a "public use" limitation
on the power of expropriation are a relatively recent misreading of
the constitutional history and text. These efforts stemmed from
nineteenth century courts' attempts to curtail what they saw as
legislative overreaching in the area of eminent domain. It will begin
by examining the civil law theories which form the basis of most
modern judicial and academic commentary. Thereafter, it will
demonstrate that the origins of eminent domain in the Anglo-
American legal tradition are to be found in the theory of consent
which forms the essence of representative government. It Will then
show that the members of the Founding Generation understood and
1248 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
August 2002] "PUBLIC USE" AND THE "TAKINGS" CLAUSE
incorporated this theory of consent into the various constitutional
provisions concerning eminent domain. Finally, it will argue that
attempts to craft devices to encourage judicial oversight of legislative
takings are without warrant in the historical record. It will conclude
by showing that the term "public use" as used in the Fifth
Amendment was meant to be descriptive, rather than proscriptive,
and that the term was not intended to operate as a substantive
limitation on Congress' power to expropriate property.
I. The Civil Law Theory
The exact origins of the power of eminent domain remain
something of a mystery. Some claim that the earliest exercise of the
power to expropriate land for public use occurred when Israel's King
Ahab took Naboth's vineyard, while others argue that the power has
been in use "since the days of the Romans."1 ° Regardless of the date
of its first use, however, the term, "eminent domain," (dominium
eminens), appears to have been coined by Hugo Grotius in 1625, in
his work, De Jure Belli et Pacis. According to Grotius,
the property of subjects belongs to the state under the right of
eminent domain; in consequence the state, or he who represents the
state, can use the property of subjects, and even destroy it or
alienate it, not only in case of direct need, which grants even to
private citizens a measure of right over others' property, but also
for the sake of the public advantage; and to the public advantage
those very persons who formed the body politic should be
considered as desiring that private advantage should yield. But, we
9. See 1 Kings 21:1-15. Israel's King Ahab desired a vineyard owned by Naboth the
Jezreelite. He offered Naboth his choice of either a new vineyard or "the worth of it in
money." When Naboth refused to sell, Jezebel, Ahab's wife, conspired with others to put
Naboth to death. The theory that this was the first taking by eminent domain was first put
forth by Merlin de Douai, a French legal theorist of the nineteenth century. It appears
that Douai cannot be correct, however, for if Ahab had such a power it would have been
unnecessary to kill the property owner.
10. PHILIP NICHOLS, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 1-14 (Julius L. Sackman ed.,
1997) [hereinafter NICHOLS]. While Justinian's Institutes make no provision for the
exercise of such a power, there is some scattered evidence to suggest that compulsory
takings existed in some form in Roman law. As one commentator has noted, "it is
impossible to believe that the construction of the Roman roads, extending in a straight line
from one end of the Empire to the other, or of the Roman aqueducts, was at the mercy of
the owners of land through which they were to pass." J. Walter Jones, Expropriation in
Roman Law, 45 L.Q. REV. 512, 521 (1929). See also Errol E. Meidinger, The "Public
Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL L. 1, 8 (1980) (claiming that
"there is a good deal of evidence to indicate that the Romans took privately held property
to further a variety of public purposes"); William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of
Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972) (questioning the precise nature of takings
under Roman law).
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must add, when this happens, the state is bound to make food at
public expense the damage to those who lose their property.
Yet, while it is often said that the power of eminent domain is an
"attribute of sovereignty,, 12 courts and commentators have disagreed
on the origin of the government's right to take property in the hands
of private parties and apply that property to some public purpose.
Two different theories have generally held sway. These might be
called the "reserved rights" and "inherent powers" theories.
Grotius' view that the state had an original and absolute
ownership of all the property possessed by its individual members
antecedent to their possession gave rise to the "reserved rights"
theory of eminent domain. According to this theory, a citizen's
possession of property was dependent on a grant by the sovereign and
his continued enjoyment of it was subject to an implied reservation
that the state might retake the property at any time for a public
purpose. In this view, an individual's ownership of property is limited
to a mere possessory right, at least with respect to the government. 3
The right to hold property is, therefore, subject to a tacit agreement
between the citizen and the sovereign that the property might be
reclaimed by the latter to meet public necessity.14
Although the reserved rights theory found its way into a number
of nineteenth century court opinions,"5 it has largely proved
11. HUGO GROTIus, 3 THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE ch. 20, § 7, at 807 (Francis W.
Kelsey trans., Oceana Publ'ns 1964). Grotius' choice of terminology was not greeted with
universal enthusiasm, however. Samuel Pufendorf criticized the use of the term,
dominium eminens, as being more appropriate to refer to the subject's power to use land
within his control. Instead, Pufendorf suggested that imperium eminens was a more
accurate expression of a sovereign's power to take property. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 1 DE
JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM, def. V, §§ 2, 6, at **24-25, *27 (C. & W. Oldfather trans.,
1934) (1688). Van Bynkershoek agreed, as did Heineccius who suggested, however, that
the term dominium eminens had come to be too firmly embedded in the literature to
admit of any full scale assault. See CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, 2 QUAESTIONEM
JURIS PUBLICI *290-92 (Tenney Frank trans., 1930) (1737); JOHANN GOIrLIEB
HEINECCIUS, 2 ELEMENTA JURIS NATURAE ET GENTIUM ch. 8 § 166 (George Turnbull
trans., 1764).
12. Metro. City Ry. v. Chicago W. Div. Ry., 87 Ill. 317 (1877).
13. NICHOLS supra note 10, § 1.13.
14. PUFENDORF, supra note 11, at *27.
15. See, e.g., Todd v. Austin, 34 Conn. 78, 88 (1867) ("The right to take property for
public use, or of eminent domain, is a reserved right attached to every man's land, and
paramount to his right of ownership. He holds his land subject to that right, and cannot
complain of injustice when it is lawfully exercised."); Beekman v. Saratoga R.R. Co., 3
Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. 1831) (Eminent domain represents "the highest and most exact idea
of property remaining in the government, or in the aggregate body of the People in their
sovereign capacity, giving a right to resume possession of the property... whenever the
public good requires it."). See also Shelton v. Shelton, 83 S.E.2d 176 (S.C. 1954).
Escheat provisions in many state constitutions reflected this theory of reserved rights.
See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 10 (repealed 1962) ("The people of the state, in their right
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unsatisfactory to many. In America, the most obvious objection
stemmed from considerations of republicanism: reservation of rights
in the sovereign sounds too much like feudalism. As a New York
court once observed, "[s]uch a doctrine is bringing the principles of
the social system back to the slavish system of Hobbes, which,
however plausible it may be in regard to land once held in absolute
ownership by the sovereignty, and directly granted by it to
individuals, is inconsistent Wvith the fact that the security of pre-
existing rights to their own property is the great motive and object of
individuals for associating into governments."'1 6
The federal nature of America's unique political structure also
posed difficulties for the theory of reserved rights. After all, two
different sovereigns, state and national, could not both be vested with
the ultimate title to land, which is the essence of the reserved right of
eminent domain. More importantly, in the original thirteen colonies,
grants of land, predated the founding of the national government in
1789, so there could be no tacit agreement giving it a power of
eminent domain. As for states created in the nineteenth century,
lands were often granted to inhabitants by the federal government
long before the states came into being. How, then, could these new
states rely on a reservation of rights antecedent to their own
existence? 7
Faced with these theoretical problems, many courts eventually
rejected the theory of reserved rights and came to view eminent
domain simply as an inherent right of sovereignty. The state's power
to take land for public use came to be regarded as a power which
inheres in the right of the state to govern the polis-which is to say,
inherent in its "police powers"-and was not dependent on any pre-
existing property right. According to this view, governments have the
sovereign power to enact any regulation affecting persons or property
located within their borders, subject only to such restrictions as might
be imposed by their constitutions. 8
of sovereignty, possess the original and ultimate property in and to all lands within the
jurisdiction of the state."). See also S.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; WIs. CONsT. art. IX, § 3.
16. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9,58 (N.Y. 1837).
17. See, e.g., New York, Housatonic & N. R.R. Co. v. Boston, Hartford & Erie R.R.
Co., 36 Conn. 196 (1869); State v. Severson, 261 N.W. 469 (Minn. 1935); Raleigh & Gaston
R.R. Co. v. Davis, 19 N.C. 451 (1837); Bloodgood, 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837).
18. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1892). In the case of both the state and
federal governments, therefore, the power of eminent domain exists apart from any
specific grant in their respective constitutions; for indeed, neither the federal nor the state
constitutions contain any explicit grant. New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662 (1836);
Heyward v. New York, 7 N.Y. 314 (1852); City of Newport v. Newport Water Corp., 189
A. 843 (R.I. 1937). Nonetheless, in an effort to avoid the apparent arbitrariness of a
doctrine which gives the appearance of making property rights insecure, courts have relied
on a theory of implied consent slightly reminiscent of Locke. According to this theory,
Defects in the Civil Law View
Although these two competing theories of eminent domain
provide conceptual justification for the existence of the power, they
suffer from the same defect. Both have the effect of making property
rights insecure and wholly dependent on the will of the government.
In essence, both start from the proposition that the sovereign has a
superior right to property held by the citizen, with the result that the
citizen's interest in property is less a title right than a mere possessory
interest. If the proponents of the inherent powers or reserved rights
view are correct, the citizen's continued enjoyment and possession of
property is always subject to being extinguished by the sovereign
without his consent. Even more important is the fact that both the
inherent powers and reserved rights theories permit no real restraint
on the sovereign's exercise of the power of eminent domain. Because
both theories vest the ultimate right to dispose of property in the
sovereign, the citizenry has no grounds for complaint when the
sovereign takes property by eminent domain. This is the case
whether the sovereign acts arbitrarily or not. Such a view would seem
to be incompatible with traditional concepts of democracy and
property rights.
Over the years, therefore, courts and commentators have
attempted to counter the obvious harshness of this conclusion by
imposing a "public purpose" limitation on the use of eminent domain.
This limitation requires that government takings of private property
be for a "public use," which has been variously defined as "a public
good,' 9 "public benefit," 20 or "public necessity."2' At the same time,
however, a great deal of judicial energy has since been expended
attempting to establish when a particular taking is for a public
purpose. What most have overlooked, however, is the fact that the
so-called "public use" requirement is really a rather late innovation in
the law of eminent domain and is found mainly in nineteenth and
twentieth century American cases. In fact, none of the civil law
writers were willing to go so far as to assert absolute limitations on
the sovereign's prerogative powers.' Moreover, neither established
practice nor doctrine limited the exercise of eminent domain to
every member of civilized society is said to have consented to the government's right to
take property when necessary to achieve an important public purpose. Secombe v. R.R
Co., 90 U.S. 108 (1874); Embury v. Connor, 3 N.Y. 511 (1850); Thatcher v. Dartmouth
Bridge Co., 18 Pick. 501 (Mass. 1836); Livingston v. Mayor, 8 Wend. 85 (N.Y. 1831). This
theory has been criticized, however. Garrison v. New York, 88 U.S. 196 (1874).
19. In re Forsstrom, 38 P.2d 878 (Ariz. 1934).
20. Filbin Corp. v. United States, 265 F. 354 (E.D.S.C. 1820).
21. Griffith v. S. Ry. Co., 131 S.E. 413 (N.C. 1926).
22. See, e.g., GROTIUs, supra note 11, at 385; PUFENDORF, supra note 11, at *25
BYNKERSHOEK, supra note 11, at **291-98.
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purely public uses prior to the American Revolution.3  On the
contrary, both the colonial and confederation governments made
extensive use of the power to expropriate property for all manner of
social and economic ends, many of which involved the transfer of land
from one private party to another.
In the early years of the Republic, judges often limited their
scrutiny of legislative takings to ensuring that some form of
compensation was available to those whose property had been
expropriated.2' This is most likely because the scale of most takings
remained within the range already long practiced in both the colonial
and confederation period.' However, the increase in industrialization
in the early part of the nineteenth century led to an expansion of the
23. Meidinger, supra note 10, at 16.
24. In the latter part of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century, state
court judges frequently used the principle of just compensation to restrain legislative
takings. William Fisher, Ideology, Religion and the Constitutional Protection of Private
Property: 1760-1860, 39 EMORY L.J. 65, 104 (1990). In most cases, courts simply relied on
provisions already contained in the relevant state constitution. Where no explicit
provision existed, however, courts did not hesitate to impose a compensation requirement
out of a sense of "natural justice" or "equity." J.A.C. Grant, The Higher Law Background
of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WiS. L. REv. 67,71 (1931). The most famous example
of this jurisprudence is found in Chancellor Kent's decision in Gardner v. Village of
Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816). Here, Kent struck down a New York statute
authorizing without compensation the diversion of a stream on plaintiff's property in spite
of the fact that the state's constitution lacked a specific compensation requirement. Id. at
166. In so doing, Kent argued that requiring compensation was "a clear principle of
natural equity" that was "adopted by all temperate and civilized governments, from a deep
and universal sense of justice." Id. Kent's decision was followed through the years by a
number of decisions invalidating a variety of state statutes for failing to provide
compensation. See, e.g., People v. Platt, 17 Johns. 195 (N.Y. 1819) (striking down criminal
statute requiring dam owners to build or maintain a fish ladder); Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20
Johns. 103 (N.Y. 1822) (act authorizing building of canal over turnpike road declared void
for failure to provide compensation); Piscataqua Bridge Co. v. N.H. Bridge Co., 7 N.H. 35
(1834) (striking down statute appropriating a bridge franchise without payment of
compensation); Parham v. The Justices, 9 Ga. 341 (1851) (invalidating statute authorizing
the taking of land for roads without payment of compensation). This was the case even in
jurisdictions where the state constitution lacked a specific compensation provision. Even
when they did uphold statutes, many courts still acknowledged the force of Kent's reliance
on natural law. See, e.g., Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129 (N.J. 1839) (upholding
statute but noting that the right to compensation was "a settled principle of universal
law"); Bonaparte v. Camden & Ambor R.R. Co. 3 F. Cas. 821 (C.C.D. N.J. 1830) (No.
1617) (requirement of compensation was a "universal principle"); Petition of Mt.
Washington Road Co., 35 N.H. 134 (1857); Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 44 (1847)
(asserting that the Fifth Amendment "does not create or declare any new principle of
restriction.., but simply recognized the existence of a great common law principle
founded in natural justice") (italics in original); Harness v. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co.,
1 Md. Ch. 248 (1848).
25. Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L.
REV. 203, 205-07 (1978) (discussing the limited use of eminent domain for economic
development in the early Republic).
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role of eminent domain in the economy. The mill acts, which
throughout most of the colonial period had been used to encourage
the building of grist mills, were now used to transfer property for the
building of saw mills, cotton mills, pulp mills, and foundries. What
had once been statutes for providing a public convenience-a place
where "all the inhabitants of the neighborhood should be entitled to
have their grinding done in turn and at fixed rates"-' had been
redirected to what appeared to be increasingly private interests.' In
time, therefore, the use of eminent domain to accomplish a wide
range of purposes gave rise to concerns about legislative
overreaching.' Fearful that legislatures were overstepping their
bounds, later judges began to rely on the concept of "public use" to
impose limits on legislative power. After all, merely requiring
compensation did little to restrain takings of land for the building of
railroads, mills, and other economic development projects. Judges
thus sought to breathe life into the term, "public use," thereby
injecting substantive content into a phrase that most people in the
founding generation thought to be merely descriptive. In so doing,
however, courts wound up altering the focus of eminent domain.
Lacking any warrant in the historical record requiring that takings be
for an actual public use, courts began to rely on natural law theories
as espoused by writers such as Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf to
support their desired restrictions.
26. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9,15 (N.Y. 1837).
27. Meidinger, supra note 10, at 23.
28. This expansion of the use of eminent domain was first challenged in 1832, when a
group of New Jersey property owners contested the legislature's right to take their land to
build mills along the Delaware River. In Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq.
694, 729 (1832), the New Jersey chancery court rejected the challenge, noting that "[tihe
ever varying condition of society is constantly presenting new objects of public importance
and utility." Consequently, "what shall be considered a public use or benefit, must depend
somewhat on the situation and wants of the community for the time being." In essence, to
the Scudder court the overall benefits to the community from the increased economic
activity provided adequate justification for the legislature's action. Courts in other states
followed the reasoning of Scudder and advanced the principle that a taking which
contributed to the overall benefit of the community was permissible use of the eminent
domain power. See, e.g., Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866); Boston & Roxbury Mill
Corp. v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467 (Mass. 1832); Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444
(1867); Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. 1831).
The result was the widespread use of statutes designed to delegate the state's eminent
domain power to private interests for the creation of a wide variety of manufacturing
projects designed to achieve desirable economic ends. The ruling in Scudder and other
cases gave some manufacturing enterprises the status of public utilities in order to allow
them to expropriate some of America's choicest water power sites. At the same time,
however, legislatures anxious to attract private investment did not attempt to regulate
these enterprises as public utilities. Manufacturers thus enjoyed the best of both worlds.
Harry N. Scheiber, Comment, Public Rights and the Rule of American Law in American
Legal History, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 217,225 (1984).
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The earliest statement of this view is found in a concurring
opinion by Senator Tracy in Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson
Railroad Co.29 Concerned about the power of the legislature to
authorize almost any taking for an economic purpose, Tracy
questioned whether any limit might be put on the government's
power to expropriate property:
When we depart from the natural import of the term "public use,"
and substitute for the simple idea of a public possession and
occupation that of public utility, public interest, common benefit,
general advantage or convenience, or that still more indefinite term
public improvement, is there any limitation which can be set to the
exertion of legislative will in the appropriation of private
property?'
Although he was less certain of the force of his concerns on
takings by state legislatures by virtue of their police powers, Tracy
was sure that the Fifth Amendment imposed a requirement that
expropriations by the federal government be for a direct public use.
In his view, the federal constitution required "a direct use by the
government itself through its officers, and for the purposes of the
government as a political being.., and it may be doubted whether
the national government has the power by virtue of sovereignty, to
take private property, without the consent of its owner, for the
purpose of dedicating it to a popular public use, by which is meant a
use by the people generally as individual beings."'31 Indeed, Tracy's
view of public use in the federal context was so narrow that he did not
contemplate the power to take land for the building of a highway.32
For Tracy, the use of the phrase "public use" in the Fifth
Amendment was "designed to be as well a limitation as a definition of
the right of the [federal government] as sovereign ... to interfere with
the otherwise absolute right of the citizen to the undisturbed
possession and enjoyment of his own property."33 The expropriation
clause of the Fifth Amendment could only be construed "as
equivalent to a constitutional declaration, that private property
without the consent of the owner, shall be taken only for the public
use," by which he meant "direct possession, occupation and
enjoyment by the public."' Tracy did not cite any authority for this
proposition, however. Instead, he simply assumed that the drafters of
the Fifth Amendment consciously intended to take the law of
expropriation much farther than the civilians ever dared. In other
29. Bloodgood, 18 Wend. at 56-62 (Tracy, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 60.
31. Id at 59.
32. Id-
33. Id.
34. Id (italics in original).
words, Tracy's view was based on the assumption that in drafting the
Fifth Amendment, the first Congress intended to make a bold new
statement of property rights.
Tracy's opinion in Bloodgood marked the start of a long struggle
to define the precise limits of the power of eminent domain.
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, American courts
came to accept the view that the power of eminent domain rested on
the civil law doctrines of inherent and reserved rights, and as a result,
were left with the problem of finding some means by which the
legislatures' ability to expropriate land for economic development
schemes might be constrained. The so-called public use doctrine was
settled upon as the primary means by which that restraint might be
imposed. Much of this effort was wasted, however, as no clear rule
distinguishing "public" from "private" takings has ever emerged.
Moreover, the courts themselves often disagreed as to the proper
standard. Some courts adopted a quite narrow view of public use,
requiring that there be a direct "use by the public," while others took
a broader view and allowed expropriations of property wherever
there was a "public advantage" or "benefit."'35 Consequently, by the
beginning of the twentieth century, the public use doctrine was "in a
shambles" so that predictability of result was impossible.36 The "use
by the public" standard competed with the broader "public
advantage" rule leaving courts and commentators in hopeless
confusion about the correct state of the law. This was particularly
true where the proposed condemnation was undertaken for the
immediate benefit of a private party.7  Some courts rejected private
condemnations unless the public had the right to use or enjoy the
appropriated property.' Others, adhering to the public advantage
test, approved condemnations for private enterprise where the
35. Meidinger, supra note 10, at 41-42. See, e.g., Philip Nichols, The Meaning of Public
Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 618-24 (1940) (detailing
"evasions" of the narrow view of public use limitations on eminent domain).
36. Berger, supra note 8, at 209.
37. Cf Gravelly Ford Canal Co. v. Pope & Talbot Land Co., 178 P. 150 (Cal. Ct. App.
1918) (invalidating condemnation for right of way to build irrigation ditch to privately
owned land) and Nash v. Clark, 7 P. 371 (Utah 1904), affd, 198 U.S. 361 (1905) (upholding
condemnation to create right of way for irrigation ditch to privately owned parcel).
38. See, e.g., Gravelly Ford, 178 P. at 153.
There can be no question as to the position of our Supreme Court upon this
question. It has consistently held that "public use" means "use by the public,"
and that to make a use public a duty must devolve on the person or corporation
holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public
with the use intended, and the public must be entitled, as of right, to use or enjoy
the property taken.
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proposed improvement would "promote the productive power of all
citizens."39
In fact, however, the difficulty the courts face in attempting to
define the limits of eminent domain stems from the fact that they
have misconstrued the origins of the power of expropriation. The
desire to right perceived injustices in the use of eminent domain for
economic development led early courts to use civil law doctrines in an
effort to restrain what they saw as legislative overreaching. Thus,
nineteenth century courts seized on civil law concepts of "public use"
in an effort to limit legislative expropriations. These courts
overlooked the fact that the civilians' attempts to limit the sovereign's
power of eminent domain were mere contrivances designed to
constrain a power which they ultimately recognized had no limits.
After all, the civilian concept of eminent domain arose in the context
of unlimited sovereignty, one outcome of which is the principle that
the king could do no wrong. Thus, the civil law writers' discussions
concerning public use were mere admonitions, for they recognized
that the king was immune from challenge on this point: In the final
analysis, the king might take property for a good purpose, or no
purpose at all. No action would lie against the king and no legal right
to compensation would accrue.
As a result, while the public use requirement has a certain
intellectual appeal, it is a doctrine of quite recent origin and was
confected in an attempt to avoid the logical implications of the two
civil law theories of eminent domain. Lacking any coherent basis for
distinguishing between "public" and "private" uses, modem courts
have left confusion in their wake; for, in attempting to manufacture
limitations on the civil law power of eminent domain, American
courts have tried to fit the square peg into the round hole.
H. A Consent Theory of Eminent Domain
It is important to note that while civilians, such as Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Vattel, wrote extensively about the power of eminent
39. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clearview Water Supply Co., 69 A. 870,872 (Pa. 1908).
It is not essential that the whole community, or any considerable portion thereof,
should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement, to make the use public.
If the proposed improvement tends to enlarge the resources, increase the
industrial energies, and promote the productive power of any considerable
number of the community, the use is public. The building of reservoirs for the
storage of water, and the laying of mains for the purpose of supplying and
transporting water and water power for commercial and manufacturing purposes,
would tend to increase the industrial enterprises and promote the productive
power of all citizens who desire to avail themselves of water or water power for
these purposes in that community.
IM (internal quotations omitted).
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domain, there is little evidence that their writings had any significant
impact on English practice. On the contrary, the power to take land
or other property for public use appears to have existed in Enland
long before Grotius ever coined the term, "eminent domain." In
fact, a form of compulsory taking was a feature of English law at least
as early as the sixteenth century, and its origin and exercise appear
wholly unrelated to the institution described by the civilians. Indeed,
the rather unique development of takings in England is a reminder of
the danger inherent in assuming there must always be a connection
when similar rules exist in successive legal regimes. For, in point of
fact, the power of eminent domain did not exist at common law.
Relying on the Magna Carta's injunction that no man be deprived of
his freehold except by the lawful judgment of his peers,41 Blackstone
asserted that the Crown had no inherent power to take land, even for
a public purpose:
So great.., is the regard of the law for private property, that it will
not authorise the least violation of it; no, not even for the general
good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to
be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps
be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man,
or set of men, to do this without the consent of the owner of the
land. In vain it may be urged, that the good of the individual ought
to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to
allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge
of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no.
Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested,
than in the protection of every individual's private rights.42
Strictly speaking, therefore, the Magna Carta prevented the
operation of any doctrine akin to Grotius' description of eminent
domain. The English king simply had no power to take private
property without compensation, even when the taking was for public
use.
40. In fact, the term, "eminent domain," was unknown to the common law, and
neither the colonial charters nor the early state constitutions made use of it. George v.
Consol. Lighting Co., 89 A. 635, 637 (Vt. 1914). As a result, early American cases do not
utilize the phrase, and it is not until the second decade of the nineteenth century that
courts or commentators use the term "eminent domain" with any regularity. See, e.g., In
re Wellington, 16 Pick. 87 (Mass. 1834) (referring to "that sovereign power over all
property, inherent in all governments, sometimes called the right of eminent domain").
41. Magna Carta, 1215, c. 39 ("No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or
dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him,
or send upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.").
42. 1 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
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A. Prerogative Takings
As with all rules, however, there are bound to be exceptions, and
the one stated by Blackstone had several. In certain limited
instances, the king had the power to take private property without
compensation or consent where necessary to defend the realm or
where he was thought to have some special property right. These
takings had their origins in the period before Parliament achieved its
ascendancy, and should more properly be seen as exercises of the
king's prerogative rather than takings by eminent domain. The
prerogative takings fall into two categories. In the first were takings
justified by the doctrine of necessity. The second encompassed
takings where the Crown was thought to have a superior title.
Takings by necessity usually arose in matters of defense. The
Crown had long possessed the power to enter upon land to erect
protections against foreign invasion or incursions of the sea. Such
intrusions were grounded on the principle that "the King ought of
right to save and defend his realm, as well against the sea, as against
the enemies, that it should not be drowned or wasted."43 The king
might, therefore, erect bulwarks and other fortifications on private
land, tear down houses in the suburbs of a city, or dig in grivate land
for saltpetre to make gunfire, if necessary to wage war. Necessity
also justified the king in razing houses to prevent the spread of fire,
4
1
or building walls or dikes to protect lands from imminent flooding.46
The king also had the power to erect beacons or lighthouses on
private property to warn against the approach of the enemy and to
guide vessels at sea.47 In essence, the prerogative enabled the king to
act in the public interest and without making compensation to private
parties for property taken or destroyed. In so doing, however, the
king made use of a subject's property but did not necessarily take title
in fee simple (or retake title under a "reservation of rights" theory).
The subject was still considered the owner of the soils. Although
modern American jurisprudence might consider such intrusions to be
takings sufficient to require the payment of compensation, English
law did not.
The Crown might also take property by virtue of its prerogative
in ways that did not implicate the doctrine of necessity. In this second
class of takings, the king was said to have a superior property right in
43. Isle of Ely, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139,1139 (K.B. 1609).
44. The King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1295 (K.B. 1606).
45. Id.
46. Isle of Ely, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1141. See also HENRY E. MILLS & AUGUSTUs L.
ABBOTT, MILLS ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 4 (2d ed. 1888) (discussing takings
by virtue of "overruling necessity").
47. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *265. See also An act concerning Sea
Marks and Mariners, 8 Eliz., c. 13, § 2 (1565) (Eng.).
the objects seized. Thus, the Crown had a right to all royal fish
(whales and sturgeon), abandoned shipwrecks, waifs (goods stolen
and thrown away by a thief in his flight), estrays (wandering animals
whose ownership is unknown), and treasure trove (goods unclaimed
by the owner).4  Compensation was not required for the taking of
these categories of property because they were considered bona
vacantia, or goods in which no one else could claim a property right.
The king also had title to all gold and silver found in the ground so
that he might have metal to produce coin for circulation.49
Yet, while they might be extensive, the Crown's prerogatives
never extended to the right to take property by eminent domain.
Although the king might enter upon, take, or destroy land or
tenements out of necessity, he could never take title to them, or do
any act "tend[ing] to the disinheritance of the subject."50 In those
instances where the king took possession of property from a subject,
his title was considered superior to that of the owner on whose lands
the goods were found."
B. Parliamentary Takings
The power to take land for a public purpose did not become a
matter of great concern until the middle part of the seventeenth
century. After all, until this point in its history, England's
government remained relatively small, and its need for public works
rather limited. The nation's economy was largely agricultural, and
thus the government did not envision a vast expanse of internal
improvements beyond such as were necessary for defense and basic
communication. Hence, roads, sewers, waterworks, and fortifications
against the sea or foreign enemies were the primary focus of land
acquisition policy.
From a very early date, however, it was clear that Parliament
alone could divest an owner of his property. The first recorded
exercise of the power to expropriate property appears to have been a
statute of 1421, in which Parliament declared the road and bridges
running between Abingdon and Dorchester to be common highways,
and authorized the inhabitants of the area to take gravel, trees, or
loam for the repair of the structures along the way.5 Later statutes
48. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *280-89.
49. Id. at *284-85.
50. The King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1295 (K.B. 1606). See also
SIR EDWARD COKE, 2 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *34-35 (1794).
51. Compensation was not required, for no owner had been deprived of a property
interest.
52. 9 Hen. 5, St. 2, c. 11 (1421) (Eng.). In particular, the Statute of Sewers of 1427,
which granted certain commissioners the power to take land for reconstructing drainage
systems, is often argued to be the first example of eminent domain in English law. 6 Hen.
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allowed condemnation for navigation improvements and sewers. For
example, in 1544, the City of London was authorized to take private
property for the erection of a public water system' 3 while a statute of
1514 authorized the City of Canterbury to make improvements along
the river, but required that anyone whose mill, bridge or dam might
be damaged or removed to be "resonably satysfyed."' 4 Similarly, a
statute of 1531 allowed commissioners of sewers to take wood or
timber from private property to repair seawalls and erect sewers,
provided that the owners be paid a reasonable price to be determined
by the commissioners.55
The increasing urbanization which marked the progress of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries resulted in the need for more
sophisticated public facilities. Parliament responded with a series of
statutes authorizing condemnation for roads,
56  bridges,57
fortifications, navigation improvements,
59 and drainage projects.6
6, c. 5 (1427). See, e.g., William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47
WASH. L. REV. 553,565-67 (1972). However, this statute seems more an attempt to aid in
the king's prerogative to protect against incursions against the sea rather than an attempt
to take lands for public use. Although it permits the building of new trenches and dikes
"as often and where shall be needful," it notes the imminent danger of destruction by the
sea, and recites the Crown's fear "that much more Hurt within a short time will happen,
unless some speedy Remedy be provided." The original statute was for ten years, but was
renewed on several occasions. See Act for Commission of Sewers, 18 Hen. 6, c. 10 (1439)
(Eng.); 23 Hen. 6, c. 8 (1444-45) (Eng.); Act for Commission of Sewers, 12 Edw. 4, c. 6
(1472) (Eng.); Act for Commission of Sewers, 4 Hen. 7, c. 1 (1487) (Eng.); Act for
Commission of Sewers, 6 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1514) (Eng.). Similarly, a statute of 1512 allowed
the taking of lands along the Cornish coast for the building of fortifications, but it
specifically cites the danger of French invasion. Act concerning the Making of Bulwarks
at the Seaside, 4 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1512) (Eng.). Neither of these early statutes provided for
compensation for the lands taken or used. A similar statute was enacted a few years later,
permitting the mayor and bailiffs of Exeter to clear the River Exe, provided that they
"shall pay to the Owners and Farmers of so much ground as they shall dig, the Rate of
twenty Years Purchase, or so much as shall be adjudged by the Justices of the Assize in the
County of Devon." Act concerning Amending the River and Port of Exeter, 31 Hen. 8, c.
4 (1539) (Eng.).
53. 2 Kent 340.
54. Act for Cleaning the River of Canterbury, 6 Hen. 8, c. 17 (1514) (Eng.).
55. Bill of Sewers with a New Proviso, 23 Hen. 8 c. 5 (1531) (Eng.).
56. Act for Enlarging Common Highways, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 16 (1697) (Eng.).
57. 14 Geo. 2, c. 33, § 1 (1741) (Eng.); 12 Geo. 1, c. 36 (1725) (Eng.); 1 Geo. 2, c. 18
(1728) (Eng.); 9 Geo. 2, c. 29 (1736) (Eng.); 12 Geo. 2, c. 33 (1739) (Eng.); 13 Geo. 2, c. 16
(1740) (Eng.); 23 Geo. 2, c. 37 (1750) (Eng.).
58. 7 Ann., c. 26 (1708) (Eng.); 31 Geo. 2, c. 39 (1758) (Eng.); 32 Geo. 2, c. 30 (1759)
(Eng.); 33 Geo. 2, c. 11 (1759) (Eng.).
59. 6 Hen. 8, c. 17 (1514) (Eng.) (clearing mills and obstructions from Canterbury to
the sea); 31 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1539) (Eng.) (removing dams and weirs on the River Exe); 7 Jam.
1, c. 19 (1609) (Eng.) (building Exeter weir).
60. These acts differed slightly from earlier statutes in that the drainage projects at
issue appeared to have been undertaken for economic development, rather than to abate
These statutes followed a similar formula: A government official was
authorized to survey property needed for the prospective
improvement.' Thereafter, the statute would often-but not
always-set out some mechanism by which the landowner would
receive compensation for his loss.62
an incursion of the sea. Parliament, therefore, set forth a means of providing
compensation, a feature which was absent from legislation designed to assist the
prerogative. See, e.g., 16' & 17 Car. 2, c. 11 (1664-65) (Eng.) (draining Deeping Fen)
(reciting the "great profitt that would arise to all persons concerned and to the
Commonwealth in generall if the same might be drayned"). See also 15 Car. 2, c. 17 (1663)
(Eng.) (Bedford Levell); 21 Geo. 2, c. 18 (1748) (Eng.); 2 Geo. 3, c. 32 (1762) (Eng.)
(Lincoln Fens).
61. It appears, however, that when it came to erecting public improvements,
Parliament did not always divest the owners of title. For example, in the 1421 statute
noted above, Parliament specifically decreed that the Abbot of Abingdon would retain all
the "Liberties and Franchises" which he had before in the "said Road, Soil, and Water,
and also all the Fishery in the Water beneath the said Bridges, and in the Ditches
aforesaid for ever." 9 Hen. 5, St. 2, c. 11 (1421) (Eng.). For example, most road statutes
made a distinction between the taking of the right to ground rents and the taking of the
fee, so that, in time, it could be said that "in a highway the king has nothing except the
passage for himself and his people, but that the freehold, and all the profits, as trees, &c.,
appertain to the lord of the soil." HUMPHRY W. WOOLRYCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF WAYS 4 (1834). See also Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 133, 143. Earlier treatise writers
agree on this point. See WILLIAM STYLE, REGESTUM PRACrICALE, OR, THE
ACCOMPLISH'D ATTORNEY 256 (1657) ("He that hath the Land on both sides of the
Highway, hath the property of the soils of the Highway in him, although the King hath the
priviledge for his people to pass through it at their pleasures."); WILLIAM NOY, THE
PRINCIPAL GROUNDS OR MAXIMS WITH AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1980) (1641) ("In the king's highway the king has only passage
for himself and his people; and the freehold and all the profits are in the lord of the soil, as
they are presented at the leet."). Thus, road acts passed during latter part of the
seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth century provided that "Recompence" be
made "to the Owners and others interested in the said Ground Rent or Charge... for
their Interest... not exceeding Five & twenty Yeares Purchase." Upon payment of these
sums, the "Interest of the said Persons in the said Ground-Rent or Charge shall be for ever
divested out of them." 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 16 (1696-1697) (Eng.) (italics added).
Consequently, it appears that while Parliament might have possessed the power to divest
owners of land absolutely, it retained a healthy aversion to doing so unless absolutely
necessary.
62. The payment of compensation was never an absolute requirement of takings by
statute, although Parliament usually ensured that the owner was compensated in some
way for his loss. While most statutes authorizing takings provided that an owner would be
compensated for lands taken from him, a landowner might be without a remedy where
Parliament failed to specify a right to compensation. See, e.g., 1 NICHOLS, supra note 10, §
1.22[1]. ("[I]t must be remembered that even in England, if an injury to property is
expressly authorized by act of Parliament, the courts of justice can give no redress, no
matter how grossly the provisions of the Magna Carta have been violated."). In most
cases, Parliament provided that the amount be determined by appraisers or by a jury. The
earliest method of redress lay in the use of the writ ad quod damnum. This writ issued out
of the chancery and was directed to the sheriff of the county to summon a jury to inquire
whether it would be to the damage of the king or any other person to grant a liberty or
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C. The Need for Parliamentary Consent
By the time of the American Revolution, therefore, it had long
been established that the taking of land for public purposes was a
power that could be exercised by Parliament alone. In this principle
one finds the most important distinction between the use of eminent
domain in England and the kind of takings described by Grotius and
the civilians. The civil law writers' belief that the sovereign retained
the right to take back lands or property granted to the subject had
very little currency in English law, at least after the Magna Carta, and
certainly none at all after the Glorious Revolution. Thus, while it is
clear that Parliamentary supremacy was not a universally
acknowledged fact until the fall of the Stuarts, 3 there is little evidence
that the Crown ever claimed the right to seize property belonging to
the subject on basis of an implied reservation of title. Moreover,
while the exercise of the prerogative in the creation of fortifications
and defenses appears to have some basis in an inherent rights theory,
any pretense that the prerogative was unlimited would have been
contradicted by the express terms of the Magna Carta and the
centuries of practice which followed. Simply put, the power of
eminent domain described by Grotius and others would have been an
alien concept to English courts or legal commentators.
franchise. Beginning about the middle of the seventeenth century, it was used to
determine the amount of compensation due an owner of property when a road or highway
was built over his land. By use of the writ, the owner sought to have a jury determine the
damage to him of land taken for public use. See, e.g., 14 Car. 2, c. 6 (1662) (Eng.). Some
later statutes prescribe a similar procedure without specific mention of the precise writ.
See 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 16 (1696-1697) (Eng.). See also Ex parte Armitage, 27 Eng. Rep. 199
(K.B. 1756); Isle of Ely, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (1606); The King v. Warde, 79 Eng. Rep. 832
(K.B. 1632). In time, the use of the writ declined as it was thought too fraught with
difficulty and expense. Instead, most later statutes allowed the taking of private property
upon payment of compensation determined by appraisers appointed by the judges of the
assizes. See, e.g., 7 Jam., c. 19, § 3 (1609) (Eng.) (providing that payment for damages be
offered by the corporation, with a right of appeal to the assizes in the event the parties
cannot reach agreement on the amount). Parliament often took private property without
payment, however. In the road acts, the legislature authorized the surveyors of roads to
enter upon land and take gravel or other soils to repair the king's highways. Such takings
were to be made "without Licence, Controllement, or Empeachment of the Owners" of
the lands from which the material was taken. 9 Hen. 5, c. St. 2, c, 11 (1421) (Eng.)
(authorizing taking of clay, gravel, or trees); 5 Eliz., c. 13 (1562-63) (Eng.) (permitting
taking of gravel from nearby quarries or lands); 14 Car. 2, c. 6 (1662) (Eng.) (authorizing
taking of gravels, etc.).
63. The seventeenth century was marked by a long struggle between Crown and
Parliament over the king's right to govern without parliamentary consent. The struggle
came to a head in the Civil War, and was then ultimately concluded by the Glorious
Revolution. J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 5-6 (1966).
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It appears instead that the power to expropriate property in
England is best understood as being a function of the theory of
consent inherent in a representative government. That is to say, the
power to take property for public use resides in the legislature, and
not the executive, because such takings require the consent of the
owner and that consent can only be given directly or through his legal
representatives. In this respect, takings by eminent domain are on
the same footing as takings through taxation. Just as the sovereign
lacks the power to levy taxes without consent of the legislature, so,
too, does it lack the power to take property from a subject without
similar consent.
The principle of consent was well established in English law even
before the Civil War. Parliament itself had its origins in the medieval
tradition of baronial counsel and consent, which was based on the
"feudal idea that [the magnates] could speak for their tenants-in-
chief, who could in turn speak for their tenants, and so on."' By the
middle of the fourteenth century, consultation and participation in
law-making had been extended from the earls and barons to
representatives of the counties and towns.6' These representatives
were regarded as "having full power (plena potestas) to bind their
communities to whatever decisions were made in Parliament, which
were consequently regarded as being made by 'common consent."' It
was thus assumed that "the consent of every individual within each
community was merged in the consent of that community, and that
the common consent of every community was merged in the common
consent of the whole community of England." Through a principle
of "virtual representation," all members of the community were said
to have consented to whatever had been done by the king, lords and
commons gathered in Parliament.67
64. JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT 28 (1999).
65. Id. at 29.
66. Id.
67. The medieval and renaissance English concept of representation thus differed
from more modern conceptions of representative government in that members of the
Commons were said to give consent "on behalf of those for whom, rather than by whom,
they were sent." Ld. at 69. They were supposedly elected for their superior wisdom, and
were to be guided "by their own judgments, after full discussion in Parliament, rather than
by the preferences of those they represented." Id. Years later, Edmund Burke advanced
this idea when writing to his British constituents in 1774. Parliament was not "a congress of
ambassadors from different and hostile interests, against other agents and advocates; but
Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole,
where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good,
resulting from the general reason of the whole." EDMUND BURKE, SPEECH AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE POLL (1774), in 2 THE WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 12-13 (1865-
71). Sir William Blackstone concurred, and asserted that:
every member [of the Commons], though chosen by one particular district, when
elected and returned serves for the whole realm[,] ... [flor the end of his coming
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The Magna Carta's prohibitions against the taking of property
without due process of law meant that the king was forced to treat
with Parliament over the grants and taxes necessary to fund his
adventures and maintain his household. As a result, Sir John
Fortescue, (c. 1395-1477) Chief Justice of England and sometime
Lord Chancellor, was able to argue that the king could neither impose
taxes on his subjects "nor change their laws, nor make new ones,
without the concession or assent of his whole realm expressed in his
parliament." ' For Fortescue and later thinkers, the idea of consent
was wrapped up in the idea that in Parliament, "everie Englishman is
entended to bee there present... [a]nd the consent of Parliament is
taken to be everie mans consent."69  Consequently, Parliament's
decision to impose a tax or to take property from a subject was made
with the consent of all the realm.70
As a result, "[t]he fiction that the consent of Parliament was
tantamount to the consent of every subject meant that property rights
could be transferred or altered by the King in Parliament, but not by
the King alone."7' In 1533, Chief Justice Montague justified
Parliament's powers in this regard by noting that "when a gift is made
by Parliament, every person in the realm is privy to it, and assents to
it, but yet the thing shall pass from him that has the most right and
authority to give it."'  There was apparently little fear that
Parliament would abuse its powers in this regard because property
interests were well-represented within its ranks. As between king and
Parliament, the latter was thought "fittest for the preservation of that
thither is not particular, but general; not barely to advantage his constituents, but
the common wealth." Therefore, a representative "is not bound.., to consult
with, or take the advice, of his constituents upon any particular point, unless he
himself thinks it proper or prudent to do so.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *159.
68. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE 87 (S.B. Chrimes ed. &
trans., 1949).
69. SIR THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 49 (L. Alston ed., 1906) (1583).
70. To be sure, the idea that Parliament represented every man seems odd to readers
steeped in modem theories of representation. Indeed, it became a prime point of
contention between the American colonists and the British government in the years
leading to the American Revolution. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, REPRESENTATION IN
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 2-12 (1969) (describing American objections to the theory
of virtual representation). Yet, it is likely that the members of the early parliaments were
a "reasonable representation of the 'political nation,"' because they were largely
composed of that body of landowners who might be expected to take part in public affairs
and whose assets would most likely be called upon to meet any tax, tallage, or taking.
Goldsworthy, supra note 64, at 69. As a result, the principle that takings of property
required the "common consent" of the realm obtained in Parliament was "almost
universally accepted" by the middle part of the fifteenth century. Id.
71. Id.
72. Wimbish v. Tailbois, 75 Eng. Rep. 63, 95 (K.B. 1533).
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fundamental propriety which the subject has in his lands and goods,
because each subject's vote is included in whatsoever is there done."'
Moreover, the assumption that every subject was represented in
Parliament gave rise to the doctrine of infallibility with respect to
Parliamentary enactments. In advancing this theory, Sir John
Fortescue observed that rules enacted by the king alone might be
corrupted by selfishness or carelessness:
But the statutes of England cannot so arise, since they are made not
only by the prince's will, but also by the assent of the whole realm,
so they cannot be injurious to the people nor fail to secure their
advantage. Furthermore, it must be supposed that they are
necessarily replete with prudence and wisdom, since they are
promulgated by the prudence not of one counsellor nor of a
hundred only, but of more than three hundred chosen men.., with
such solemnity and care.74
Not only does this mean that judges have no power to void a
statute, 75 it also meant that the king in Parliament was omnicompetent
and might legislate over any matter that might come before it.7"
Indeed, as Christopher St. German observed, Parliament "has an
absolute power as to the possession of all temporal things within this
realm, in whose hands soever they be... to take them from one man,
and give them to another without any cause of consideration, that it
binds the law of conscience. '
And, while royalists often espoused a more limited role for
Parliament than that contended for by Fortescue and others, the long
struggle in the seventeenth century over the Crown's right to levy
taxes without parliamentary consent established the principle that no
man's property could be taken for a public purpose in the absence of
consent by his representatives. Thus, in delivering the judgment in
the Ship Money Case in 1637, Sir George Croke declared that "[t]he
common law of England sets a freedom in the subjects in respect of
73. S.R. GARDINER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOcUMENTS OF THE PURITAN
REVOLUTION 114 (3d ed. 1906).
74. FORTESCUE, supra note 68, at 41. Fortescue did recognize, however, that statutes
might be drafted so as not to give full effect to Parliament's intention. In such case, they
could be amended "in the manner in which they first originated." Id. It might "be rightly
concluded [therefore] that all the laws of this realm are the best in fact or potentiality,
since they can easily be brought to it in fact and actual reality." Id. at 135.
75. English judges "are all bound by their oaths not to render judgement against the
laws of the land, even if they should have the commands of the prince to the contrary."
SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE NATURA LEGIS NATURAE 205 (C. Fortescue trans., Garland
Pub. 1980) (1869).
76. CHRISTOPHER SAINT GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 327 (William Muchall
ed., The Lawbook Exchange 1998) (1531).
77. CHRISTOPHER SAINT GERMAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING THE DIVISION
BETWEEN SPIRITUALITY AND TEMPORALITY, in 9 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ST.
THOMAS MORE 177-212 (J.B. Trapp ed., 1979) (1532).
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their persons, and gives them a true property in their goods and
estates; so that without their consent (that is to say their actual
consent or implicitly in Parliament) it cannot be taken from them.,1
8
Moreover, much of the debate over the king's right to levy taxes
without consent were equally applicable to expropriations of land.
Later writers often put taxation and takings on an equal footing,
insisting that both were based on a theory of consent. In essence, the
principle of "no taxation without representation" became "no
expropriation without representation. ' 79
John Locke put the matter rather succinctly:
The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of his
Property without his own consent. For the preservation of Property
being the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into
Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should
have Property.... 'Tis true, Governments cannot be supported
without great Charge, and 'tis fit every one who enjoys his share of
the Protection, should pay out of his Estate his proportion for the
maintenance of it. But still, it must be with his own Consent, i.e.,
78. Sir George Croke, Notes of the Judgment Delivered by Sir George Croke in the
Case of Ship-Money, reprinted in W.J. JONES, POLITICS AND THE BENCH: THE JUDGES
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 186, 187-88 (1971). See also Rex v.
Hampden, 3 St. Tr. 825,846 (Ex. 1637).
79. After the Glorious Revolution, it was fairly well decided that the theoretical basis
for taxation of the subject was founded on the principle of gift, rather than taking.
FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 25 (1985). In fact, it had long been
recognized that Parliament's consent to taxation had to be obtained. Communities in
different parts of the kingdom had originally been required to select reliable persons, to
whom they would depute the power to treat with the king and commit their communities
to grants of taxes. Property could not be legally seized but must be given. POLE, supra
note 63, at 4. In the early years, however, the "initiative had always come from the king,
an initiative that included the basic decision to call a parliament, the purposes in view, the
scope and limits of discussion, and the termination of the meeting. Id. As time went on,
however, tensions arose over whether Parliament owed its legal existence to the
"initiative" or whether it existed by natural right, thus setting the stage for the seventeenth
century struggle. According to Blackstone, taxation arises from the fact that "few men are
deputed by many others to preside over public affairs, so that individuals may the better
be enabled to attend to their private concerns." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES *307. As a result, it is necessary that the citizenry "contribute a portion
of their private gains, in order to support that government, and reward that magistracy,
which protects them in the enjoyment of their respective properties." Id In making such
contributions, however, "the things to be aimed at are wisdom and moderation, not only in
granting, but also in the method of raising, the necessary supplies; by contriving to do both
in such a manner as may be most consistent with economy and the liberty of the subject."
Id. at **308-09. Wisdom and moderation were achieved by having all three branches of
the legislature (king, commons, and lords) be engaged in the decision-making process. In
most instances, this meant that tax bills were initiated in the commons and then approved
by the lords. The reasoning behind this was that "such supplies are raised upon the body
of the people, and therefore it is proper that they alone should have the right of taxing
themselves." Id. at *169.
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the Consent of the Majority, giving it either by themselves, or their
Representatives chosen by them.'°
To be sure, there is an important difference between a taking by
eminent domain and one by taxation. As Locke notes, a taking by
eminent domain requires some form of compensation, while the latter
does not. Taxation does not implicate a right of compensation,
because in levying a tax, the legislature merely charges the citizenry
for its fair share of the cost of running the government. Takings by
eminent domain, on the other hand, might require the payment of
compensation, although the right was never thought to be absolute.
This is because at its most elemental level, a taking by eminent
domain implies nothing more than that a property owner has made a
gift or sale of his property for the benefit of the public. In other
words, through his representatives, a property owner has consented
to giving up a portion of his property for some greater public purpose.
The legislature might, therefore, consent to the transfer on behalf of
the owner for a price or without any compensation at all.
In this way, then, statutory transfers of property for the public
good were made with or without compensation, and it was left to
Parliament to determine (on the owner's behalf) whether fairness
required some value for the taking. In most cases, Parliament
required that some form of payment be made when property was
taken for public use. The exceptions were usually in cases where the
thing taken was thought to be of negligible value, as for example
when gravel taken from the "wastes" of private lands." As a result,
by the middle part of the eighteenth century, Blackstone was able to
discuss the compensation requirement in the language of a sale of
property (albeit a forced one) from its owner to the body politic, with
the legislature acting as the intermediary.
[Where land is required for the public good,] the legislature alone
can, and indeed frequently does, interpose and compel the
individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not
by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary
manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for
the injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an
individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the
legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for
a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of a power, which
the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the
legislature can perform.
80. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 378, 380 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1967) (1690).
81. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *140.
82. Id.
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While Blackstone's use of the forced sale stretches the concept of
consent, it reinforced the idea that, in English law at least, the taking
of land for public use could only be effected by the legislature acting
on behalf of the property owner. Blackstone's description also shows
that the power of eminent domain was a well established feature of
English law by the time of the American Revolution. More
importantly, the English justification for the exercise of the power
was markedly different than that put forward by the civilians. The
English theory of expropriation owed its existence to the growth and
maturation of the theory of parliamentary consent, rather than to the
concepts of inherent or reserved rights. Indeed, the civil law theories
of eminent domain, with their basis in the absolute rights of kings,
would have had little attraction for Englishmen who had just spent
the better part of a century fighting to restrain royal prerogative.
Instead, Englishmen believed that Parliament alone had the power to
take land for public use. And, as the highest court of the land, it was
left to Parliament to determine the right and extent of any
compensation. As a result, without constitutional restrictions on
Parliament's power, the use of eminent domain was limited only by
those restraints the legislature imposed on itself.
I. Revolution and the Principle of Consent
The seventeenth century in England was marked by a long
struggle between Crown and Parliament over the extent of the royal
prerogative. Parliament and the king often disagreed about who had
the right to consent on behalf of the subject, a debate which
effectively ended in the Glorious Revolution. The lines of argument
shifted dramatically when the debate moved to the colonies, however.
By the middle part of the eighteenth century, questions about the
Crown's prerogative to take property had all but been resolved.
Instead, the primary issue was now whether Parliament itself was the
appropriate agency to provide the colonists' consent to the
expropriation of their property. Thus, in the colonies, the debate
over the right to take property for public use was transformed from
one over royal prerogative into one about whether Parliament was
adequately representative of the people. And, as time passed,
colonial political theorists moved tentatively, but inexorably, to the
position that Parliament lacked the ability to consent on behalf of the
colonists because that body did not adequately represent their
interests. Colonial political leaders soon came to argue that their
local assemblies were more representative of their interests and were
the primary locus of colonial consent in matters of taxation and
takings. The debate over which body-Parliament or the colonial
assemblies-had the right to exercise the power of consent in the
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
takings context thus became part and parcel of the larger struggle
over Parliament's right to govern the colonies generally. As in
England, this question, too, was ultimately settled by a dramatic
reconfiguration of the constitutional scheme.
At the outset, American thinking about property rights in the
revolutionary era was neither original nor very distinctive. When it
came to discussing the right of the state to take property for public
use, Americans often hewed quite closely to traditional English
doctrine. Like the parliamentary political theorists of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, colonial pamphleteers placed their faith in
the doctrine of consent. Relying on both common law precedent and
Locke's theory of the social compact, the colonists made two
assertions about the government's right to take property for public
use. First, they repeated the well-established principle that the taking
of property from a subject was a legislative act, rather than a
prerogative of the Crown.' Second, they asserted that a citizen was
entitled to compensation for takings of property that were in excess
of his proportionate share of taxation.
In time, however, the colonists also raised concerns about the
adequacy of Parliament as a representative institution in such a way
as to implicate the question of whether parliamentary takings were as
arbitrary and oppressive as those of the Crown, a question which was
itself tied up in the debate over the theory of virtual representation."'
In the end, the colonists came to reject the idea of "virtual
representation" on which parliamentary power was based, thereby
foreclosing the possibility that Parliament had any power to consent
on their behalf, and in so doing, ensured that a break with the mother
country was inevitable.
The Debate over Parliamentary Authority
The end of the Seven Years' War brought about a change in
British colonial policy. Now invested with a vast North American
empire, London cast about for some means to defray the expenses of
maintaining the far-flung military and governmental apparatus
necessary for administering its expanded territorial holdings. In 1764,
83. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 16 (1992).
84. This principle was invoked in Bate's Case, 145 Eng. Rep. 267 (1606), as well as the
Ship Money Case, 3 St. Tr. 825 (Ex. 1637). Parliament asserted its rights in this regard in
both the Petition of Right, 3 Car., c. 1 (1627), and the Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (1688).
In The Petition of Right, Parliament advanced the argument that no man could be
compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge without
common consent by act of Parliament, and that none be called to make answer, or take
such oath, or to give attendance, or be confined, or otherwise molested or disquieted
concerning the same, or for refusal thereof. 3 Car., c. 1 (1627).
85. See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
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Parliament implemented a new scheme of taxing the colonies to help
defray the costs of the war now ended, as well as providing for their
continued defense. This new system created a number of new taxes
and imposts as well as a more extensive, and efficient, new
enforcement mechanism.Y The Crown's attempt to solidify its control
forced the colonies to carefully consider their place in the
constitutional scheme.
In the years between 1760 and 1776, the colonists engaged in a
series of increasingly more vigorous protests against the new system,
each of which was met in turn with more vigorous attempts to assert
parliamentary power.' At the same time, colonial political thinkers
produced a number of documents in which they attempted to justify
their grievances against Crown policy. As they did so, these writers
gradually focused their attention on constitutional theory, and framed
their arguments in the language of fundamental law. The bulk of the
colonists' complaints against British rule centered on the problem of
taxation, which in turn implicated the principle of representation.
But, in many respects, the rhetoric of representation employed by the
colonists to oppose parliamentary taxation applied with equal force to
the expropriation of property for public use.
Much of the debate centered on the constitutional question of
whether Parliament had the right to impose "internal" taxes on the
colonies. Opponents of the policy argued that the new taxes violated
fundamental law and were unconstitutional because, "[a]ccording to
prevailing English doctrine, taxation of the subject required
consent-at least in the fictional sense that it required approval by a
body in which the subject was represented."" The colonists argued
that Parliament could not rightfully levy taxes upon them because
Americans were not actually represented there.9 Perhaps the best
known defense of this position was James Otis' pamphlet, The Rights
of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved. Written in anticipation
of passage of the Sugar Act in 1764, Otis declared that taxation
without representation was contrary to "the law of God and nature"
and contrary to property rights that "no man or body of men, not
excepting Parliament... consistently with.., the constitution can
86. Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843,869 (1978).
87. See id. at 877 n. 182-83.
88. See id. at 874, 878.
89. Id. at 870.
90. Although considered as subjects of the Crown, residents of the American colonies
did not have the right to send members to the House of Commons.
take away."'" Other colonists took up Otis' arguments. Connecticut
Governor Thomas Fitch asserted that the "right" of self-taxation was
"the chief excellency of the British Constitution,"' while Otis's friend
Oxenbridge Thacher claimed that the right to self-taxation was "the
birthright of every subject."'  Colonial assemblies joined in this
chorus, and drafted petitions to the Crown and Commons attacking
Parliament's right to lay taxes on the colonies. The New York
legislature declared that the right of self-taxation was "the natural
Right of Mankind, '' while the Virginia House of Burgesses asserted
that such taxes as were proposed by the Commons were "inconsistent
with the fundamental Principles of the [English] Constitution. '
Passage of the Stamp Act in 1765, brought forth even stronger
complaints. Daniel Dulany repeated the claim that the right of self-
taxation was an essential principle of the English Constitution,
derived from the common law and "enforced by the declaration of
the Great Charter and the Bill of Rights, neither the one nor the other
introducing any new principle. 96 Dulany's assertions were repeated
in still more petitions from colonial assembliese and in resolutions
adopted by extra-legal associations such as the Sons of Liberty.98 The
Stamp Act Congress of October 1765, ultimately expressed its
opposition to the policy of internal taxation by declaring that "no
Taxes be imposed on them, but with their own Consent, given
personally, or by their representatives." 99
91. James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764), in
PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 409, 444 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965)
[hereinafter PAMPHLETS].
92. Thomas Fitch, Reasons Why the British Colonies in America Should Not Be
Charged with Internal Taxes (1764), in PAMPHLETS, supra note 91, at 379, 386.
93. Oxenbridge Thacher, The Sentiments of a British American (1764), in PAMPHLETS,
supra note 91, at 492.
94. New York Petition to the House of Commons (Oct. 18, 1764), reprinted in
PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS,
1764-1766, 9, 10 (Edward Morgan ed., 1959) [hereinafter PROLOGUE].
95. The Remonstrance to the House of Commons (Dec. 18, 1764), in PROLOGUE,
supra note 94, at 17.
96. Daniel Dulany, Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British
Colonies (1765), in PAMPHLETS, supra note 91, at 635.
97. See, e.g., The Virginia Resolves (1765), in PROLOGUE, supra note 94, at 46; Rhode
Island Resolves (1765) in PROLOGUE, supra note 94, at 52; Pennsylvania Resolves (Sept.
21,1765), in PROLOGUE, supra note 94, at 51.
98. The Sons of Liberty, Wallingford, Conn. (Jan. 13, 1766), in PROLOGUE, supra note
94, at 114; The Sons of Liberty, New York (Jan. 11, 1766), in PROLOGUE, supra note 94, at
115; The Sons of Liberty, New Brunswick, N.J. (Feb. 25, 1766), in PROLOGUE, supra note
94, at 115.
99. The Declarations of the Stamp Act Congress (Oct. 1765), in PROLOGUE, supra
note 94, at 63.
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The debate over representation was broadened with passage of
the Quartering Act in 1766. This act required the colonies to provide
supplies to British troops stationed in America. The colonial
legislatures considered this requirement a taking of property without
consent, and none complied. The ministry of Lord Townshend
retaliated by suspending the New York assembly, which had been
among the most vehement of the act's opponents." This action,
combined with imposition of more taxes in the form of the
Townshend duties of 1767, prompted spirited opposition. The
following year, John Dickinson's Letters of a Pennsylvania Farmer,'O
castigated the Townshend government, asserting that Parliament
lacked the legal authority to require the colonies to provide supplies
for the troops because the Quartering Act amounted to a tax. The
people of New York could not be "legally taxed but by their own
representatives," and thus could not be punished for insisting on their
right to self-taxation) °2 Samuel Adams took up Dickinson's line of
attack in the Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1768. In terms
reminiscent of Locke, Adams deftly stated the prevailing American
view of property rights:
[I]t is an essential unalterable Right in nature, ingrafted into the
British Constitution as fundamental Law & ever held sacred &
irrevocable by the Subjects within the Realm, that what a man has
honestly acquired is absolutely his own, which he may freely give,
but cannot be taken from him without his consent.1ln
Defenders of British policy admitted the force of the American
argument, but responded that the colonists were "virtually"
represented in Parliament, because each member of the House of
Commons was said to represent all British subjects, not just those
who actually sent him to Westminster."° The colonists rejected the
idea of virtual representation, however, and thereby transformed the
debate about consent into one about nature of representative
institutions. Both sides agreed that property could not be taken from
the subject without his consent, given either directly or by his legal
representatives. The real question, therefore, was whether
Parliament was sufficiently representative of the colonists such that it
had the capacity to give their consent. American political leaders
contended that representation was itself dependent on suffrage. In
their view, Parliament did not represent the colonies, because
100. MERRILL JENSEN, THE FOUNDING OF A NATION 225-26 (1968).
101. 1 THE WRrrINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON 279 (P. Ford ed., 1895).
102. Id at 309-10.
103. 1 THE WRrrINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 185 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., Octagon
Books 1968) (1904).
104. Thomas Whately, The Regulations Lately Made Concerning the Colonies and the
Taxes Imposed upon Them (1765), in PROLOGUE supra note 94, at 20-21.
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Americans had no say in the election of its members. For the
colonists, consent was a function of actual, rather than virtual
representation.
Having discarded the theory of virtual representation, it was only
a short step to rejecting all parliamentary authority. What had started
out as a debate over the right of Parliament to tax the colonies
without their consent, ended with the colonists asserting that only
those bodies to whom they actually sent members could properly
represent them. The American consensus was expressed in the
pamphlets of Jefferson, Adams, and Wilson," and finally declared by
the First Continental Congress in its resolves of 1774. Americans,
Congress said, had "by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of
the English constitution, and the several charters or compacts [the
right] to life, liberty & property" that no sovereign power had "a right
to dispose of without their consent."1" Congress also asserted that
Americans had "a free and exclusive power of legislation in their
several provincial legislatures... in all cases of taxation and internal
policy, subject only to the negative of their sovereign."1 "7 In making
these assertions, Congress suggested a theory of "federalism" for the
British empire: American legislatures would have control over
internal legislation and taxation, while Parliament would retain power
over internal and external trade. The colonies would remain tied to
the English king as distinct states under one monarch. s London's
refusal to entertain this radically new conception of empire ushered in
the American Revolution.
IV. Republican Limits on the Power of Consent
According to Thomas Jefferson, the "whole object" of the
revolutionary struggle was to determine the proper means by which
the people should be represented in their government. While the
focus of much of the debate was on the legitimacy of virtual and
actual representation, all sides were agreed that "the only moral
foundation of government is, the consent of the people."' ' For the
105. Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America (1774), in
TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 256 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967); John Adams,
Novanglus, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 11 (Charles Adams ed., 1851); James
Wilson, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British
Parliament, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 501 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896).
106. 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 67 (Worthington Chauncey Ford
ed., 1904).
107. Id. at 68.
108. Grey, supra note 86, at 888.
109. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in 9 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 375 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1850-56). Some of the flavor of the argument
over the principle of virtual representation can be found in Wood, supra note 70, at 2-12.
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colonists, the theory of consent required that the "people should be
consulted in the most particular manner that can be imagined"
whenever they were to be called upon to surrender their property for
a public purpose.10
The drafters of the early state constitutions took great pains to
put this principle into practice. Their language reflected Lockean
concepts of property rights as well as Locke's theory of representative
government. Among the earliest constitutions, that of Pennsylvania
made the connection most explicit. Its 1776 declaration of rights
contained language that might have been lifted directly from the Two
Treatises:
[E]very member of society hath a right to be protected in the
enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to
contribute his proportion towards the expence of that protection,
and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent
thereto: But no man's property can be justly taken from him, or
applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal
representatives."'
Virginia's constitution contained similar language, making an
even more direct connection between suffrage and the protection of
property rights:
[E]lections of members to serve as representatives of the people, in
assembly, ought to be free; and that all men, having sufficient
evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to
the community, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed or
deprived of their property for public uses, without their own
consent, or that of their representatives so elected, nor bound by
any law to which they have not, in like manner, assembled, for the
public good.
Together, these two formulations affirmed the principles
advanced by the colonists in the debate over virtual representation.
The new states declared the taking of property, either by taxation or
by expropriation, to be a function of consent given by the actual
owner or through representatives in whose election the property
owner had a right to participate."' The Virginia and Pennsylvania
provisions were to serve as models for other states as well. Delaware
(1776), Vermont (1777 & 1786), Massachusetts (1780), and New
Hampshire (1784), adopted one of the two formulations almost
110. Essay (Philadelphia, June 22, 1774), 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES 442 (Peter Force ed.,
1840).
111. PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. VII (1776).
112. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 6 (1776).
113. It is interesting to note that Americans never really abandoned the theory of
virtual representation. Women, slaves and children never participated in elections, yet
they might conceivably have been required to surrender property through taxation or
eminent domain.
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verbatim."' In fact, the consent theory soon became the dominant
textual formula for protecting property rights from arbitrary takings,
existing in some form in eight of fourteen state constitutions."'
It is important to note, however, that most state constitutions
omitted any specific mention of a right to compensation.16 But, the
absence of an explicit provision requiring compensation for the taking
of property should not be seen as evidence of a rejection of the
compensation principle. On the contrary, compensation was a well-
established feature of takings by eminent domain in both England
114. Delaware, Massachusetts and New Hampshire adopted the Pennsylvania formula.
Vermont's 1777 constitution adopted a portion of the Virginia language. VT. CONST. art.
II, cl. 1 (1777). The Vermont constitution of 1786 adopted a version of Pennsylvania's
provision. VT. CONST. art. X, cl. 1 (1786). The North Carolina and Maryland constitutions
advanced the same principles, although the language here was more limited, focusing
mainly on taxation. The Maryland Declaration of Rights repeated the language of
compact, declaring that every person "ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes,
for the support of government." It then affirmed the principle of legislative consent
asserting that "no aid, charge, tax, fee, or fees, ought to be set, rated, or levied, under any
pretence, without consent of the Legislature." MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS arts. XII,
XIII (1776). See also N.C. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XVI (1776) (declaring that the
people "ought not to be taxed or made subject to the payment of any impost or duty
without the consent of themselves or their Representatives").
115. A number of commentators have asserted that only three states had provisions
concerning eminent domain. These writers have generally focused on provisions
concerning compensation, however, and have overlooked the many provisions detailing
the consent theory of property rights. See, e.g., Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 591 (asserting
that "the commonest language respecting property rights was what may be called the
Magna Carta or due process formula"); William Michael Treanor, Note, The Original
Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694,
698. (1985) ("Only three [state constitutions] had clauses concerning takings."); J.A.C.
Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REV. 67,
69 (1931) (asserting that only the Massachusetts, Vermont, and Pennsylvania constitutions
contained provisions concerning eminent domain). Other state constitutions lacked a
provision specifically relating to takings of property, relying, it seems, on the Magna
Carta's due process formula to ensure that property rights would be protected. See, eg.,
S.C. CONST. art. XLI (1778).
116. While Massachusetts and Vermont expressly required the payment of just
compensation when land was taken for public use, most other state constitutions lacked
any such guarantee. Indeed, an express right to compensation did not appear in even a
majority of the constitutions of the original thirteen states until well into the nineteenth
century. Thus, by 1800, only three states (Massachusetts, Vermont, and Pennsylvania,
which had revised its 1776 constitution) contained compensation guarantees. The rest
adopted such provisions rather slowly. These included Connecticut (1818), New York
(1821), Rhode Island (1842), and New Jersey (1844), Maryland (1851), and South Carolina
1868). Five states still had no compensation requirement at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified-Delaware, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Virginia.
(Georgia's 1865 constitution had a compensation guarantee, but the provision was deleted
in its 1868 constitution.)
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and America long before the Revolution."7 This is not to say that
compensation was awarded in every case, for the various state
legislatures often expropriated property without offering the owner
any monetary compensation. Rather, the lack of compensation in
most of these cases most likely stemmed from the legislatures'
determination that the thing taken was of negligible value, rather
than from a belief that compensation was unnecessary.
More importantly, the textual silence on the issue of
compensation merely reflected the widespread faith in legislative
virtue prevalent in the years immediately following the revolution. 8
Caught up in the euphoria of republicanism, most Americans thought
there was little danger that a popularly elected assembly would
oppress the citizenry. As the "voice of the people," state legislatures
"could be trusted to perceive the common good and define the limits
of individual rights.' '  In drafting new constitutions, therefore, most
states concentrated on placing limits on the executive, rather than
confining the powers of the legislature. Republicans "brooded almost
obsessively about the corruption that they believed great individual
power had produced in England."'20  Consequently, most state
constitutions severely cabined the powers of the executive in an effort
to ensure that similar abuses would not occur in the new nation. As a
result, the earliest expropriations clauses should be more properly
regarded as limits on the power of the executive, again making clear
the principle that the taking of property for public use was a function
of legislative power and not an executive prerogative. They did not,
in other words, attempt to place any restrictions on the power of the
people's representatives. In this respect, the early clauses merely
codified the conventional understanding of property rights in the area
of taxation and eminent domain, and served as models for the
inclusion of similar protections in the U.S. Constitution.
117. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. See also Stoebuck, supra note 10, at
579 ("In the colonies themselves the granting of compensation was established and
extensively practiced at and before the time of the Revolution."); ELY, supra note 83, at 5-
17 (cataloging evidence of compensation in colonial and confederation takings statutes).
118. Nevertheless, some commentators have argued that the failure to include
compensation clauses in state constitutions was a function of the fact that Americans of
the revolutionary generation did not regard the payment of compensation as important.
In the view of these scholars, the absence of a just compensation clause "accorded with the
faith in legislatures that was a common element of republican thought and with the
position held by many prominent republicans that the property right could be
compromised in order to advance the common good." Treanor, supra note 115, at 695.
See also MORTON J. HoRWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860
63-64 (1977).
119. Treanor, supra note 115, at 701.
120. 1&
V. The Fifth Amendment
While the Revolutionary War produced dramatic economic
dislocations, state legislatures added to the wartime difficulties by
enacting a number of measures which made property rights look less
secure. Large emissions of paper money by the Continental Congress
and the state governments subjected property values to rapid
erosion.' Within a few years after the start of the war, paper money
issues had increased to produce rapid inflation so severe that the
value of currency had nearly evaporated.1 " Following the war,
however, American importers found themselves closed out of British
markets in the Caribbean, thus preventing them from making indirect
remittances to pay for goods received. The combined downward
pressure on prices caused by both the loss of foreign markets and the
scarcity of specie resulted in severe deflation throughout the latter
part of the 1780s. State governments again responded, this time with
a series of tender laws, which required creditors to accept depreciated
paper currency in full satisfaction of pre-existing obligations. In so
doing, state governments ensured that debtors would largely escape
paying the full value of their debts."
These measures alarmed the commercial elite. Writing in 1780,
Gouveneur Morris cautioned that the stability of the American
system of government was being jeopardized by the states' repeated
violations of property rights. Morris wrote:
The whole system of commerce hath been inverted the laws of
property invaded, the laws of justice infringed, every absurdity
practised, and every impossibility tried, to get a little beef and a
little bread which would almost have come forward of themselves if
things had been left to their natural course, if honest labour had
been permitted to reap the blushing clusters of plenty in the lap of
freedom."
In the view of many, paper money emissions and tender laws
were attacks on the sanctity of property, and the inevitable result
would be economic chaos. More importantly, for a new nation
121. Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property Rights on the
Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REv. 1135, 1137 (1980).
122. Prices rose so fast that a wholesale price index of seventy-eight in 1775 rose to a
level of 10,544.1 in 1780. Id. During the war years, state governments enacted a number
of measures designed to stabilize the local economy, but which proved both controversial
and ineffective in the end. Among these were paper money and tender laws. A scarcity of
specie during the early years of the war caused many states to issue large amounts of paper
currency. In essence, these emissions allowed states to borrow money for the war effort.
The states offered notes to investors in return for specie or tradesmen in return for
supplies. Over time, however, states began to issue larger amounts of notes causing earlier
emissions to decline in value.
123. Id. at 1139-40.
124. PA. PACKET & GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila., Mar. 23,1780).
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attempting to attract foreign investment, laws infringing property
rights would drive investors away. In Morris' view, foreigners would
look at state legislation and ask, "If your government so little respects
the Property of their own Citizens... how can our Property be safe
among you?"'' Similarly, James Madison worried about the "present
anarchy of commerce" and cautioned that "most of our political evils
may be traced to our commercial ones."'
The desire to put property rights on a more secure footing thus
became an important factor in the drive for a new frame of
government in the years leading to the Convention of 1787.'1
However, in proposing the creation of a stronger union, the framers
of the Constitution excited fears and suspicions about the extensive
powers given the national government. As a result, ratification of the
Constitution came only after a long and bitter struggle, and even then
many anti-federalists refused to be reconciled to the new Constitution
without the incorporation of amendments that would protect the
states. Consequently, over two hundred amendments were proposed
by the various state ratifying conventions. Although many federalists
opposed any substantial revision of the Constitution, they were
willing to accept some modest amendments in the hope that
addressing anti-federalist fears would stem the calls for a second
constitutional convention. In fact, the promise of amendments was all
125. GOUVERNOR MORRIS, ADDRESS TO THE PENNSYLVANIA ASSEMBLY (1785),
reprinted in JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 73 (1990). Morris was referring to attempts by the Pennsylvania
General Assembly to revoke the charter of the Bank of North America.
126. LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 226-27 (1865). Ironically,
the economic policies pursued by the state legislatures had the effect of encouraging the
forces of centralized government. Alexander Hamilton asserted that one of the main
arguments in favor of adopting the federal Constitution was that it would afford
"precautions against the repetition of those practices on the part of the state governments,
which have undermined the foundations of property and credit." FEDERALIST No. 85
(Alexander Hamilton). Writing a few years after ratification of the Constitution,
Hamilton observed that:
the sacred rights of private property have been too frequently sported with from
a too great facility in admitting exceptions to the maxims of public faith, and the
general rules of property. A Desire to escape from this evil was a principal cause
of the Union which took place among good men to establish the National
Government.
Alexander Hamilton, The Vindication of the Funding System, No. III (May-Aug. 1792),
reprinted in 11 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 470 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1966).
127. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 83, at 41.
By 1787 many political leaders were convinced that only a more energetic
national government could sufficiently protect property ownership, regulate
commerce, and restore public credit. Ironically, the assaults on property rights
during the Confederation period stimulated greater constitutional safeguards for
property holders.
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that stood between ratification and rejection in many states. In
addition, many members of Congress-James Madison among
them-were forced to promise that they would support amendments
to the Constitution if elected."l Madison thus introduced a proposed
list of amendments in the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789.'"
Although many in Congress were loathe to take up the subject of
amendments at that point in time,'" the House eventually agreed to
refer Madison's proposals to a select committee composed of one
member from each of the states then represented in Congress.'
In drafting his amendments, Madison did not attempt to achieve
any systematic statement of the fundamental rights of citizens. On
the contrary, Madison himself seems not to have believed that
amendments were necessary. Although he might not have been
entirely satisfied with the Constitution's current form, Madison
clearly believed that any attempt to make significant alterations so
soon after its adoption was premature. He was also concerned about
the continuing calls for a second constitutional convention, and feared
128. Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 98
IOWA L. REV. 145,222 (2001).
129. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES JOURNAL 84 (Linda Grant DePauw ed., 1977) [hereinafter 1789
HOUSE JOURNAL].
130. Many members argued that the House had more important business at hand. At
this point in time, the House was considering several revenue bills, as well as bills to
establish the treasury, war, and state departments. One member complained that it would
be "extremely impolitic to go into the consideration of amending the Government, before
it is organized, [and] before it has begun to operate." THE CONG. REG. (June 8, 1789)
(statement of Rep. Smith), reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS: DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 811 (Charlene
Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter 11 DHFFC].
131. The question of how to deal with Madison's amendments generated a great deal of
debate. Madison envisioned a series of amendments incorporated into the text of the
Constitution itself, which would clarify the powers of the various branches. It was
important, he said, that amendments be interwoven into the text. Otherwise, "it will be
difficult to ascertain to what parts of the instrument the amendments particularly refer,
[and] will create unfavorable comparisons." Incorporating amendments would allow them
to "stand upon as good foundation as the original work." THE CONG. REG. (Aug. 13,
1789) (statement of Rep. Madison), reprinted in 11 DHFFC, supra note 130, at 1222.
Roger Sherman opposed this suggestion on the grounds that "the constitution is the act of
the people and ought to remain entire." Amendments, on the other hand, were the work
of the state governments, and, while proper under the terms of Article V, stood on a
different footing than the original document. In his view, the act of the people in
ordaining a government in convention was markedly different than that of the state
legislatures in proposing amendments. To include the amendments in the text would
"repeal the old [constitution], and substitute a new one." Id. at 1221, 1229 (Aug. 13, 1789)
(statement of Rep. Sherman). In the end, the House voted to leave the body of the
Constitution unaltered and append a bill of rights at the end of the text. Id. at 1308 (Aug.
19,1789).
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that reopening the document to revision would be disastrous.132 At
the same time, however, Madison knew that a "great number" of
Americans remained dissatisfied with the Constitution. But, he was
sure that "a great body of the people" were "inclined to join their
support to the cause of federalism" if the Constitution were to
provide more definite protections for the liberty of the citizen.' The
Constitution had, after all, received the approval of a bare majority of
the states, and two states still remained outside the union. Including
basic protections for civil liberties would, in Madison's view, go a long
way toward disarming anti-federalist complaints."
For Madison, then, amendments were an attempt to quiet
objections to the current form of the Constitution and "satisfy the
public mind that their liberties will be perpetual."'35 At the same
time, he knew that attempting a grand synthesis of rights and
protections would be doomed to failure, since "nothing of a
controvertible nature [could] be expected to make its way thro' the
caprice & discord of opinions which would encounter it in Congs.'
13 6
As a result, Madison sought to craft a document which would reflect a
consensus about widely shared values in a form that would be
132. 11 DHFFC, supra note 130, at 820 (June 8, 1789) (statement of Rep. Madison).
I should be unwilling to see a door opened for a re-consideration of the whole
structure of the government, for a reconsideration of the principles and the
substance of the powers given' because I doubt, if such a door was opened, if we
should be very likely to stop at that point which would be safe to the government
itself.
Id.
133. Id. at 819.
134. Id.
It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in this house, that, notwithstanding the
ratification of this system of government by eleven of the thirteen United States,
in some cases unanimously, in others by large majorities; yet still there is a great
number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it; among whom are many
respectable for their talents, their patriotism, and respectable for the jealousy
they have for their liberty, which, though mistaken in its object, is laudable in its
motive. There is a great body of the people falling under this description, who at
present feel much inclined to join their support to the cause of federalism, if they
were satisfied in this one point: We ought not to disregard their inclination, but,
on principles of amity and moderation, conform to their wishes, and expressly
declare the great rights of mankind secured under this constitution.
Id. See also Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 347 (Robert Al. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1979)
[hereinafter MADISON PAPERS] (acknowledging his belief that amendments protecting
rights were "less necessary in a republic" but arguing that a bill of rights was necessary to
head off calls for a second convention).
135. 11 DHFFC, supra note 130, at 821.
136. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in 11 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 134, at 219.
guaranteed to achieve the widest possible acceptance.' 37  Indeed,
Madison repeatedly asserted that his choice of amendments was
"limited to points which are important in the eyes of many... and
objectionable in those of none. 1
A. Drafting an Amendment
Madison suggested two amendments which were relevant to the
protection of property rights. The first was a revision of the
Constitution's preamble which would have added to the Constitution
a declaration:
That all power is originally vested in, and derived from the people.
That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the
benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally
of pursuing and obtaining happiness and security.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible
right to reform or change their government, whenever it be found
adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.'39
Madison's proposed wording echoed the language of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, which was itself expressive of John Locke's
compact theory of government.1" Even more importantly, Madison's
137. ELY, supra note 83, at 83.
138. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15,1789), in 11 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 134, at 219. See also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson
(June 30, 1789), in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 134, at 272 (explaining that "every
thing of a controvertible nature.., was studiously avoided" so as to increase the chances
of passing a bill of rights); Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 21,
1789), in 12 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 134, at 348-49:
It has been absolutely necessary, in order to effect anything, to abbreviate
debate, and exclude every proposition of a doubtful and unimportant nature.
Had it been my wish to have comprehended every amendment recommended by
Virginia, I should have acted from prudence the very part to which I have been
led by choice. Two or three contentious additions would even now prostrate the
whole project.
I.
139. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES JOURNAL 84 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1977) [hereinafter 3
DHFFC]; 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES 9 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986)
[hereinafter 4 DHFFC].
140. Cf. VA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ 1-3 (1776):
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society they cannot, by
any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.
Id. § 1. "That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that
magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amendable to them." Id. §2.
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language, like Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, stressed the
importance of acquiring propert and not merely the protection of
existing property arrangements.4 In this way, Madison attempted to
use the Constitution's preamble as a means of calling attention to the
fundamental principles on which America's republican form of
government was established.
While no single representative contested Madison's claim on
substance, many thought his additions to the preamble unnecessary.4 2
Indeed, Madison's proposal did not survive long. The House
committee charged with considering amendments deleted most of
Madison's Lockean language and substituted the comparatively
modest assertion that "[g]overnment [was] intended for the benefit of
the people, and the right establishment thereof [was] derived from
their authority.', 143 However, even this was too much for most of the
members of the House. James Jackson of Georgia opposed any
alteration to the preamble, arguing that "the words as they now stand
speak as much as it is possible to speak, it is a practical recognition of
the right of the people to ordain and establish governments, and is
more expressive than any other mere paper declaration.""
Connecticut's Roger Sherman agreed and asserted that "the words
'We the people' in the original constitution are copious and
expressive as possible; and any addition will only drag out the
sentence without illuminating it."
45
Madison's second proposal would have amended Article I of the
Constitution to provide that "[n]o person shall be... obliged to
relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use,
without a just compensation."'6 The select committee to whom the
resolution on amendments had been referred altered Madison's
proposal slightly. The committee's draft read as follows:
No person shall be subject, except in case of impeachment, to more
than one trial or one punishment for the same offence, nor shall be
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people[;] ... and that, when any government shall
be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community
hath an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or
abolish it, in such manner as shall be judges most conducive to the public wealth.
Id. §3.
141. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 29 (1998).
142. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 27 (1998).
143. H.R. COMM. REP. (July 28, 1789), reprinted in 4 DHFEC, supra note 139, at 27.
144. THE CONG. REC. (Aug. 13, 1789) (statement of Rep. Jackson), reprinted in 11
DHFFC, supra note 130, at 1228.
145. THE CONG. REC. (Aug. 14, 1789) (statement of Rep. Sherman), reprinted in 11
DHFFC, supra note 130, at 1242.
146. 4 DHEFFC, supra note 139, at 10.
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compelled to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall yrivate
property be taken for public use without just compensation
This omnibus amendment came before the House sitting as a
committee of the whole on August 17, 1789. After a brief debate
concerning the double jeopardy clause, the committee of the whole
unanimously approved the amendment as written, and numbered it as
article eight. Apparently, no one made the slightest comment about
the part of the amendment dealing with expropriation.' s A similar
silence greeted the amendment when put forward in the whole
House, for observers of the day noted that the proposal was "adopted
without debate."'49 The House approved the articles of amendment
on August 24, 1789, and forwarded them to the Senate for its
consideration. 5
The Senate first considered the eighth article on September 4.1"1
After revising the double jeopardy clause, it agreed to the remaining
part of the amendment without debate.'52 A few days later, the
Senate combined portions of the eighth article with portions of the
House's tenth article.'53 This combined article dealt primarily with
147. H.R. COMM. REP. 8 (July 28, 1789), reprinted in 4 DHFFC 27, supra note 139, at
29.
148. THE CONG. REC. (Aug. 17, 1789), reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON
SENATE DEBATES 1283, 1288-89 (Kenneth R. Bowling and Helen E. Veit eds., 1998)
[hereinafter 9 DHFFC].
149. THE CONG. REC. (Aug. 21, 1789), reprinted in 9 DHFFC, supra note 148, at 1309,
1310. See also 1789 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 129, at 158, 159.
150. 1789 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 129, at 165, 166 (Aug. 24, 1789).
151. The articles of amendment were read in the Senate on August 25, 1789. The
Senate agreed to consider the House's proposals on September 2 after a motion to defer
consideration of the amendments until the next session of Congress was defeated. 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791: SENATE
LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 135, 138 (Linda Grant De Pauw ed., 1972) [hereinafter 1789
SENATE JOURNAL]. The Senate then proceeded to debate and amend the various
amendments throughout the early part of September. Id. at 148-52. The eighth article,
which was the precursor to the present Fifth Amendment, was first considered on
September 4. Id. at 153, 154.
152. The Senate broadened the reach of the double jeopardy clause by deleting the
words, "except in case of impeachment to more than one trial or one punishment," and
substituting the phrase, "be twice put in jeopardy of life or liinb by any public
prosecution." Id. at 154.
153. The tenth article provided:
The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of War or
public danger) shall be by an impartial Jury of the Vicinage, with the requisite of
unanimity for conviction, the right of challenge, and other accostomed requisites;
and no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherways infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment by a Grand Jury; but if a crime be
committed in a place in the possession of an enemy, or in which an insurrection
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rights available in criminal cases. Specifically, it required a grand jury
indictment for criminal prosecutions and contained prohibitions on
multiple prosecutions and self-incrimination. These protections were
supplemented by the two property rights provisions contained in the
House version.
After making several revisions to other articles, the Senate
renumbered the amendments and returned them to the House for its
concurrence.'55 The House balked at accepting many of the Senate's
proposals, and for a time it seemed that the whole business might be
put off until the next session of Congress. Virginia's Richard Henry
Lee complained that the amendments had passed the Senate "with
difficulty, and [only] after being much mutilated and enfeebled.'
'15 6
Madison, in particular, felt the Senate had done a poor job. Writing
to Edmund Pendleton, Madison complained that the Senate's
alterations struck at "the most salutary articles"'57 and, as a result, the
amendments had lost "much of their sedative Value."'58 Indeed, one
observer claimed that Madison would "rather have [no amendments]
than those agreed to by the Senate. '"' 9
Although the House agreed to several of the alterations
proposed by the Senate, it refused to concur in others.' 6  A
may prevail, the indictment and trial may by law be authorised in some other
place within the same State.
H.R. RES. AND ARTS. OF AMEND. (Aug. 24,1789), reprinted in 4 DHFFC, supra note 139,
at 35, 37-38.
154. The Senate's amendment read as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment on indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or
public danger, nor shall any person be subject to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb, for the same offence, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law: Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.
1789 SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 151, at 166-67 (Sept. 9,1789).
155. Id. at 166-68.
156. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Francis Lightfoot Lee (September 13, 1789),
reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 294 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (hereinafter CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS).
157. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 14, 1789), in 12
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 134, at 402.
158. Letter from Fisher Ames to Caleb Strong (Sept. 15, 1789), reprinted in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 156, at 297.
159. Letter from Paine Wingate to John Langdon (Sept. 17, 1789), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 156, at 297.
160. Specifically, the House refused to agree to the Senate's attempt to delete the
fourth article of amendment which would have contained protections for speech and the
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conference committee was eventually appointed to consider the
differences between the House and Senate versions.16 A resolution
was eventually agreed to on September 24, and the amendments
forwarded to the states for ratification.62
The final version of what was to become the Fifth Amendment
read as follows:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or othervise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service, in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; Nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.
Although the language of Madison's original proposal was
altered as it moved through the Congress, neither the Senate nor the
House made any substantial change in substance. Madison's eminent
domain clause clearly implicated the principle of consent, and its
compensation requirement was, in effect, a recognition of the
Lockean idea that government could not require a property owner to
contribute more than his fair share of the government's expense. To
the extent a citizen is required to surrender more than his
proportionate share, he is entitled to compensation.
Madison's language on this point echoes similar language in
Locke's Second Treatise as well as that contained in state bills of
rights."6 In this respect, it might fairly be said that the so-called
press. See S. AMENDS. (Sept. 9, 1789), reprinted in 4 DHFFC, supra note 139, at 43, 44.
See also 1789 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 129, at 217 (Sept. 21,1789).
161. 1789 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 129, at 217-18 (Sept. 21, 1789); 1789 SENATE
JOURNAL, supra note 151, at 180, 181-82 (Sept. 2, 1789).
162. 1789 HOUSE JOURNAL, supra note 129, at 229 (Sept. 24,1789).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
164. Cf. Madison's Resolution (June 8, 1789), reprinted in 4 DHFFC, supra note 139, at
10 ("No person shall be... obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary
for public use, without a just compensation."); John Locke, An Essay Concerning Civil
Government, reprinted in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 378-80 (Paul Laslett ed.,
1960) ("[TJis fit every one who enjoys his share of the Protection, should pay out of his
Estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own Consent,
i.e., the Consent of the Majority, giving it either by themselves, or their
Representatives."). See also VT. CONST., ch. 1, art. 11 (1777) ("That private property
rights ought to be subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it; nevertheless,
whenever any particular man's property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought
to receive an equivalent in money."); MASS. CONST., pt. 1, art. X (1780) ("[Every citizen]
is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share to the expense of his protection; to give
his personal service, or an equivalent, when necessary; but no part of the property of any
individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own
consent, or that of the representative body of the people .... And whenever the public
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"takings clause" should more properly be regarded as a
"compensation clause." For, the use of the term "takings clause"
would seem to denote a grant of power to the legislature, as, for
example, in the use of the term "commerce clause" to describe the
granting of a power to regulate commerce. However, far from being
a grant of power, Madison's eminent domain clause was an attempt to
define the nature of a power already inhering in the national
legislature. The Fifth Amendment is, after all, concerned with
process. It sets forth the procedures by which already-existing
powers, such as the power to try offences against the government or
the power to deprive a citizen of liberty or property, may be
exercised. Seen in this context, the eminent domain clause is not a
grant of a power to expropriate property. On the contrary, it is
primarily concerned with the manner by which the national
government exercises its power to expropriate.
B. A Compensation Clause
One of the more interesting aspects of the compensation clause is
the fact that it seems to arise almost ex industria to address a problem
about which there seems to have been no discussion during the course
of the ratification debates. Although anti-federalists repeatedly
complained about the lack of a bill of rights, there is no evidence that
anyone considered the problem of eminent domain to be a serious
concern. At first glance, therefore, the compensation clause appears
to be a solution in search of a problem. Indeed, while many state
constitutions contained provisions declaring that private property
could not be taken without the owner's consent, 6 only two had
clauses requiring the payment of compensation.166 Moreover, while at
least two states had requested amendments akin to every other
provision eventually incorporated into the Bill of Rights, none put
forth an amendment requiring the payment of compensation for
takings by eminent domain. 67
The relative silence on this point has led some commentators to
assert that in proposing the compensation clause, Madison attempted
a radical alteration in the concept of individual liberty. According to
this view, the clause "reflected the liberalism of its author" and was
designed to be "a statement of national commitment to the
preservation of property rights."' s  However, the assumption
exigencies require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public
uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.").
165. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
166. MASS. CONST., pt. 1, art. X (1780); VT. CONST., ch. 1, art. 11 (1777).
167. Treanor, supra note 115, at 708.
168. Id. See also HORWrrz, supra note 118, at 63-64.
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underlying such an assessment is based on the false premise that
Americans of the early national period lacked a commitment to the
principle of just compensation for property expropriated by the
government. But, as other writers have shown, Americans had long
understood that compensation was a necessary incident of legislative
expropriations.'69 As a result, Madison's amendment did not tread
any new ground in constitutional theory. On the contrary, the
compensation clause, like the rest of Madison's Bill of Rights, merely
"reflected a consensus about widely shared values."' 70  It "simply
ratified and gave constitutional status to a long-settled principle."''
After all, both federalists and anti-federalists opposed
uncompensated takings and were all agreed that property must be
secured against government intrusion."
Others have noted the apparent lack of interest in ensuring the
inclusion of a compensation provision in the Bill of Rights.! This
lack of concern might be explained by the fact that there was little
evidence that government had thus far abused its power to take
property for public use. Neither the revolutionary nor confederation
experience created any particular concern about the expropriation
power.7 4  Indeed, not even royal officials were accused of
overstepping their bounds in this regard. As one commentator put it,
"[W]hile the British were scoundrels in a thousand ways, they never
abused eminent domain. They certainly would have been accused of
it if they had."'75  For their part, federalists did not fear that
government would engage in confiscation of private holdings.
Rather, their greatest fear was that government would devalue
property holdings by emissions of paper currency or debtor-relief
laws. Consequently, they focused their efforts on insuring that the
169. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. See also Michael W. McConnell,
Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual
Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267, 293 (1988) ("[T]here is no
evidence that the Framers believed property should ever be taken without
compensation.").
170. James W. Ely, Jr., "That due satisfaction may be made" The Fifth Amendment and
the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 1, 17 (1992).
171. Id. at 18.
172. Id. See also William W. Fisher III, Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional
Protection of Private Property: 1760-1860, 39 EMORY L.J. 65, 100-01 (1990) (noting that
anti-federalists "were even more concerned with protecting property against government
interference than their opponents").
173. See, e.g., Meidinger, supra note 10, at 17 ("[E]minent domain was not high among
the concerns of those debating the Bill of Rights."); Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 594
("[W]hile there was a popular groundswell for a bill of rights, we must frankly conclude
that there is no evidence that eminent domain limitations were given much attention.").
174. Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 594.
175. Id. (footnote omitted). See also Meidinger, supra note 10, at 17 ("Eminent domain
was one prerogative the British had not been charged with abusing in the New World.").
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constitutional text included provisions prohibiting the states from
impairing the obligation of contract.1 16 Anti-federalists, on the other
hand, were afraid that a strong central government would use its
taxing powers to impose confiscatory taxes on land." Congress's
power to lay direct taxes thus became a source of anti-federalist
opposition."' Eminent domain did not occupy a very prominent place
in the ratification debate simply because other concerns seemed more
pressing. Moreover, few expected the national government to engage
in extensive takings of property." A provision creating limitations on
takings or requiring compensation might, therefore, seem
superfluous.
At the same time, there were always lingering suspicions about
the power of a strong national government. Among these were the
fear that the government might attempt to establish a large standing
army, which would then require substantial material support. Many
in the founding generation recalled all too well the depredations on
colonial property made possible by the Quartering Act, and were
determined to prevent the federal government from having the
opportunity to recreate the experience. Others noted that
uncompensated expropriations to support military operations were
not confined to the colonial period. During the Revolution, several
writers expressed concern with the states' practice of taking supplies
for the army without compensation. For example, in 1778, writing
under the pseudonym, "A Freeholder," John Jay complained about
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall ... coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make
any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; [or] pass any... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts ... ."). See also Janet A. Riesman, Money, Credit,
and Federalist Political Economy, reprinted in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITrrION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 128 (Richard. Beeman et al.
eds., 1987) (discussing federalist fears of paper money and debtor relief schemes).
177. See, e.g., Philadelphiensis, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 118
(Herbert J. Storing, ed., 1981).
Figure to yourselves, my brethren, a man with a plantation just sufficient to raise
a competency for himself and his dear little children; but by reason of the
immoderate revenue necessary to support for the emperor, the illustrious well
born Congress, the standing army, &c. &c. he necessarily fails in the payment of
his taxes; then a hard-hearted federal officer seizes, and sells, his cows, his horses,
and even the land itself must be disposed of to answer the demands of
government.
Id.
178. Fisher, supra note 24, at 104.
179. Treanor, supra note 115, at 708-09 ("Regardless of political belief, few initially felt
that a just compensation requirement was a necessary restraint on a federal government
that would have little occasion to take property .... ). In fact, the federal government
seems not to have exerted the power of take land on its own until 1875. Until then, it
relied on the states to condemn land and transfer title. Stoebuck, supra note 10, at 559
n.18. See also Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875) (holding that federal government
had eminent domain powers).
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"the Practice of impressing Horses, Teems, and Carriages by the
military without the Intervention of a civil Ma gstrate, and without
any Authority from the Law of the Land."'  Comparing the
continental quartermasters to petty tyrants, Jay insisted that
expropriations of property be done under color of law:
It is the undoubted Right and unalienable Priviledge of a Freeman
not to be divested, or interrupted in the innocent use, of Life,
Liberty or Property, but by Laws to which he has assented, either
personally or by his Representatives. This is the Comer Stone of
every free Constitution, and to defend it from the Iron Hand of the
Tyrant of Britain, all America is now in arms; every Man in
America being most deeply interested in its Preservation.
Violations of this inestimable Right by the King of Great Britain, or
by an American Quarter Master; are of the same Nature, equally
partaking of Injustice; and differing only in the Degree and
Continuance of the Injury.'
Jay's complaint is interesting in two respects. First, his
description of the means by which property could be taken from the
subject paralleled the provisions in the various state bills of rights
which require the owner's consent, given either directly or through
his representatives." Second, it echoed the barons' complaints
against King John and follows the limits on the expropriation of
supplies contained in the Magna Carta."3
The traditional fear of large standing armies combined with the
revolutionary experience gave rise to added concern about the power
of the national government to requisition supplies without payment.
These fears led to the inclusion of a provision in the Bill of Rights
180. John Jay, A Hint to the Legislature of the State of New York (1778), in 1 JoHN JAY:
THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY, UNPUBLISHED PAPERS 1745-1780 461-62 (Richard
B. Morris ed., 1975).
181. Id. See also Republica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357, 358-59 (Pa. 1788) (Ingersoll for
the plaintiff).
[A]s between a state and its own citizens, the principle, with respect to the rights
of property, is immutably the same, in war as well as peace. Sometimes, indeed,
the welfare of the public may be allowed to interfere with the immediate
possessions of an individual.... Yet, even then, justice requires, and the law
declares, that an adequate compensation should be made for the wrong that is
done. For, the burthen of the war ought to be equally borne by all who are
interested in it, and not fall disproportionately heavy upon a few.
Id.
182. See supra notes 111-12.
183. The English king long had the power to requisition supplies for his household.
However, the Magna Carta and the statutes which followed required the payment of just
compensation. See Magna Carta, 1215, ch. 28 (allowing the king to take corn or other
provisions only on payment of compensation); 13 Car. 2, c. 8 (1661) (allowing the
compulsory use of horses, oxen and carriages with payment of a specified rate per mile);
13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 20 (1662) (Eng.) (authorizing compulsory land or water transport for the
army with payment of a specified rate).
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prohibiting the quartering of troops among the populace."8  The
compensation clause added to this protection by preventing the
government from taking property to support its troops without
payment for goods or services received. St. George Tucker admitted
as much some years later when he wrote that the compensation clause
"was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode
of obtaining supplies for the army, and other public uses, by
impressment, as was too frequently practised during the revolutionary
war, without any compensation whatever."1
This view of the compensation clause conforms to the general
tenor of the remaining parts of the Bill of Rights. As has been often
noted, the Bill of Rights was something of an anti-federalist antidote
to what was thought to be the Constitution's centralizing tendencies.
In the main, it was designed to provide safeguards against the
arbitrary exercise of power by a distant national government. Thus,
while citizens in the several states may not have had a very strong fear
that their lands might be taken for public facilities, their experience
during the war may have led a good many to worry about the federal
government's ability to requisition supplies for a large standing army.
C. Restraining Government Overreaching
While Madison may not have intended to make "a statement of
national commitment to the preservation of property rights,"' he was
concerned about the ability of legislative bodies to use their power to
subvert the individual rights. Throughout the ratification struggle,
Madison argued that the greatest danger to liberty in a Republic
came from "the violence of faction" which he defined as "a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole,
who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community."1" During his career in the
Virginia legislature, Madison saw first hand the way in which a faction
might override the rights of a part of the citizenry. He found himself
184. U.S. CONsT. amend. III. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
House, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law."
185. 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES;
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. at 305-06 (St. George Tucker ed.,
Rothman Reprints 1969) (1803).
186. Treanor, supra note 115, at 708.
187. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). See also Paul Finkelman, James
Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 301, 316 (1990)
(describing Madison's theory of faction).
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opposing the seizure of loyalist property,'s forestallment acts," and
paper money laws."9 Madison expressed his disgust with legislative
overreaching in a letter to Thomas Jefferson:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger
of oppression. In our Governments, the real power lies in the
majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary
to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is a mere instrument of the major number of the
constituents.'9'
Although he himself was unconvinced of the need for a bill of
rights-and indeed, remained unconvinced of its effectiveness in
preventing oppression-having committed himself to the venture, he
was determined to include protections for the rights of property.' 9'
The compensation clause may, therefore, also be seen as an attempt
to guard against the possibility that interests hostile to property rights
might gain a foothold in the national legislature."9
188. See, e.g., A Bill Prohibiting Further Confiscation of British Property (introduced
Dec. 3, 1784), reprinted in 8 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 134, at 173.
189. Letter from James Madison to James Madison, Sr. (Nov. 1, 1786), in 9 MADISON
PAPERS 205, supra note 134, at 205.
190. See Notes for a Speech Opposing Paper Money (Nov. 1 1786), in 9 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 134, at 158.
191. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
192. Madison dismissed the effectiveness of bills of rights as mere "parchment barriers"
and warned that "restrictions however strongly marked on paper will never be regarded
when opposed to the decided sense of the public." Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson(Oct. 17,1788), in 11 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 134, at 299.
193. By the latter part of the 1780's, it had become clear to Madison and others that
property and persons were two distinct interests in American society, and the rights of
each required certain protections. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 503 (1969) [hereinafter CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC].
"In future years," Madison noted, "a great majority of the people will not only be without
landed, but any other sort of, property." This propertyless class
would combine under the influence of their common situation; in which case, the
rights of property & the public liberty will not be secure in their hands; or which
is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence & ambition, in which
case there will be equal danger on another side.
MAX FARAND, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 204 (1966).
Madison recognized that the greatest threat to liberty in a republic would not come from a
minority attacking a majority. Rather, the greatest dangers originated in a legislature
which represented the majority of the people. Finkelman, supra note 187, at 312.
Since property and personal liberty were "both essential objects of government,"
government must be structured to provide protection to both. CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 193, at 503. One way to do that would be to make
suffrage dependent upon property; another way was to enlarge the sphere of
representation "so that no one common interest or passion will be likely to unite a
majority of the whole number in an unjust pursuit." THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James
Madison). See also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 12
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 277 (Julian P. Boyds et al. eds., 1955). As a result,
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Madison's concerns about the tyranny of the majority have led
some to conclude that many in Congress did not understand the need
to include explicit protections for property in the Bill of Rights.
Madison, it is said, was ahead of his time in urging support for his
version of the compensation clause. This view finds expression in
Professor Akhil Amar's book, The Bill of Rights. According to
Amar, Madison recognized that the greatest danger to property rights
came from "a possibly overweening majority rather than from self-
interested government agents." Unfortunately, however, Madison
was "unsuccessful in bringing the needed majorities in Congress
around to his way of thinking." Unable to obtain more explicit
protections for the rights of property, Madison was forced to try to
"slip the takings clause through.""1 4 Another commentator takes a
similar line, arguing that the "ideology underlying the [takings] clause
ran counter to the republicanism espoused by the Anti-Federalists."19 5
Both views seem to be based on the idea that large portions of the
American public still had not been reconciled to the principle that
compensation was required when property was taken for public use."
In Amar's words, "[p]roperty protection, it seems, was more central
to Madison than to some of his contemporaries.""
This assumed hostility to the right to compensation allegedly
caused Madison to resort to "clever bundling" as a means of putting
one over on every body else. By tying the compensation clause to
other, less controversial provisions guaranteeing due process in
criminal cases, Madison secured its passage.19 However, while it is
clear that the compensation clause does not fit easily with the
in crafting a new system of government, Madison thought the best means of protecting
personal and property rights lay in using "faction" to control competing interests. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). As one commentator has put it,
Madison's scheme was founded on the idea that "[d]iversity begets jealousy, and jealousy
begets security." Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Theory of Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 245,259 (1990). See also Finkelman, supra note 187, at 316-18 (describing Madison's
reliance on faction rather than a bill of rights as a means of securing liberty).
194. AMAR, supra note 142, at 77.
195. Treanor, supra note 115, at 708.
196. See, e.g., id at 713.
The Anti-Federalists apparently voiced no opposition to the just compensation
clause. Since the amendment was intended to bind only the federal government,
these critics of the Constitution had no reason to oppose the compensation
requirement: Their fear was that the federal government would be too strong,
not too weak. At the same time, in their campaign for limitations on federal
power, they had not tried to secure a compensation requirement: As
republicans, their theory of the polity legitimized uncompensated government
takings.
197. AMAR, supra note 142, at 79.
198. Id. at 78.
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remainder of his original amendment, " there is little reason to
believe that anyone was deceived by so obvious a device. Indeed,
members of both houses of Congress demonstrated a willingness to
make alterations and deletions to Madison's proposed amendments.
The Senate, in particular, had no problem deleting language and
joining portions of amendments to others, and it did so with what was
to become the Fifth Amendment. In effect, therefore, Amar's thesis
assumes that members of Congress were either too lazy or too stupid
to understand the implications of the compensation clause. If Amar
and others are correct about the reluctance of both federalists and
anti-federalists to support a compensation requirement, there seems
little reason to believe that members of the House and Senate would
sit by passively while a proposal they abhorred passed without
opposition.
D. A Commitment to Property Rights
What, then, was Madison attempting? A precise answer is, of
course, difficult to formulate from this distance in time. Nonetheless,
it seems likely that in putting forth his version of the compensation
clause, Madison sought to provide additional protections for property
rights. His experience as a member of the Virginia legislature during
the confederation period convinced Madison that such protections
were necessary if the new nation were to develop a stable legal and
economic regime.' No doubt Madison originally hoped that these
protections might be provided by the structure of republican
institutions.Y Yet, when the call for amendments became too great
to resist, Madison used the occasion to ensure that property
protections found their way into the final list of amendments.
199. Madison's original amendment provided:
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one
punishment, or one trial for the same offence; nor shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be
necessary for public use, without a just compensation.
Madison's Resolution, supra note 164, at 9, 10.
200. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (March 18, 1786), in 1
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 226-27 (1865).
Another unhappy effect of a continuance of the present anarchy of commerce
will be a continuance of the unfavorable balance on it, which, by draining us of
our metals, furnishes pretexts for the pernicious substitution of paper money, for
indulgences to debtors, for postponement of taxes. In fact, most of our political
evils may be traced to commercial ones ....
Id
201. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (arguing that the people
would "no doubt [be] the primary control on the government").
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With regard to the compensation clause in particular, it seems
that Madison intended it to have a very narrow reach. It was
designed to limit the powers of the federal government and only to
physical takings of property.2z  This was in keeping with the
majoritarian aspects of Madison's Bill of Rights, in that Madison was
apparently responding to concerns about overreaching by the federal
government. That Madison himself intended a narrow reading seems
evident when one considers that the language of his original proposal
only required compensation when a person was "obliged to relinquish
his property." 3  The choice of terminology seems to indicate that
Madison sought only to deal with takings of actual property rather
than what are now called "regulatory takings" or takings through
excessive taxation. Although both the House and Senate altered
Madison's original language, there is nothing in the debates to suggest
that the changes were intended to broaden the reach of the
amendment. On the contrary, it seems that the changes were made
for stylistic reasons.205  A year after the Bill of Rights was ratified,
Madison himself noted that the effect of the Fifth Amendment was to
commit the federal government to the principle that "no land or
merchandize" could be taken "directly even for public use without
indemnification to the owner."2°6
202. Treanor, supra note 115, at 708.
203. 4 DHFFC, supra note 139, at 10. Madison's Resolution, supra note 164, at 10.
204. Several commentators have argued that the "disproportionate impact" principle
incorporated in the eminent domain clause might be utilized to determine the
constitutionality of both taxation and regulation. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Taxation,
Regulation and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 433 (1982). See also F.
BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 106-07 (1973); Richard
Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REv.
351 (1983) [hereinafter Not Deference].
205. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
206. James Madison, Property, NATIONAL GAZETrE (March 27, 1792), reprinted in 14
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 134, at 266,267 [hereinafter Madison, Property].
In the years immediately following ratification of the Bill of Rights, courts repeatedly
asserted that the compensation clause was intended only to apply to direct, physical
takings by the national government. In 1832, in Barron v. Baltimore, the Supreme Court
held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to takings by state governments. 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 243 (1833). Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Marshall noted that while the case
was one "of great importance," he did not think the question presented was "of much
difficulty." Id& at 247. Prior to Barron, several state supreme courts took up the issue and
all asserted that the compensation clause applied only to physical takings by the federal
government. See Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 167 (N.Y. Ch. 1816)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states); Renthorp v. Bourg, 4
Mart. 97 (La. 1816) (holding that the takings clause applied only to the federal
government); Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Conn. River Co., 7 Day 28, 52 (Conn. 1828)
(Dagget, J., concurring) (suggesting that compensation clause applied only to physical
takings of property).
At the same time, however, it also seems certain that Madison
intended the clause to be a statement of fundamental values. His
earlier opposition to a bill of rights did not prevent Madison from
suggesting that such a declaration might serve an important purpose.
Foremost among these was the idea that amendments would have an
"educative function."2°7  "[P]olitical truths" declared in "a solemn
manner" would "acquire by degrees the character of fundamental
maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with
national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and
passion." ' The compensation clause, in particular, would serve as "a
statement of national intent" and "impress upon the people the
sanctity of property. ' '209  In his 1792 essay on property, Madison
asserted that the compensation clause was important in "maintaining
the inviolability of property.)
210
In essence, then, the compensation clause of the Fifth
Amendment was intended to accomplish three very important tasks:
First, at its most basic level, it was designed to constrain the
power of the federal government and limit the ability of a faction to
use its influence in the legislature to interfere with private property
rights. This was so whether that faction constituted a majority or
minority of the legislature. In this respect, then, Madison's
compensation clause is consistent with the majoritarian tenor of the
remainder of the Bill of Rights. As Akhil Amar has noted, "the main
thrust of the Bill [of Rights] was not to downplay organizational
structure, but to deploy it; not to impede popular majorities, but to
empower them."2"' Thus, in requiring compensation whenever the
207. Treanor, supra note 115, at 711.
208. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, reprinted in 11 MADISON
PAPERS, supra note 134, at 298 (1788).
209. Id. at 712.
210. Madison, Property, supra note 206, at 267. In the same essay, Madison asserted
that a government committed to the protection of property rights would dishonor that
commitment if it were to
directly violate[] the property which individuals have in their opinions, their
religion, their persons, and their faculties... [or] indirectly violated their
property, in their actual possessions, in the labour that acquires their daily
substinence, and in the hallowed remnant of time which ought to relieve their
fatigues and soothe their cares.
Id. at 267-68 (emphasis in original).
Madison uses the word, "property" here in its Lockean sense, and includes within its
purview the concept of rights in general. This broad conception of property has led some
commentators to conclude that the compensation clause should apply to both regulatory
takings and excessive taxation. See, e.g., Not Deference, supra note 204. While it is clear
that Madison was concerned with ensuring that government respected a wide range of
property rights, there is no indication that Madison ever intended such a broad reading of
the compensation clause itself.
211. AMAR, supra note 142, at 276.
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national government took private property for public use, the
compensation clause addressed anti-federalist fears of strong
centralized government, by limiting the circumstances under which
the national government would be able to deprive the citizenry of
their property. It prevented a distant and "lordly" legislature from
expropriating the property of their lowly constituents without
payment.1 2 After all, it must be remembered that the "extraordinary
powers of the Senate were vested in twenty-six men, fourteen of
whom would constitute a quorum, of which eight would make a
majority. '21 3 At the same time, however, the compensation clause was
protective of minority rights, and thus satisfied federalist fears that a
landless majority might gain control of the national legislature and
impose confiscatory regulations on property in the way state
legislatures had done during the confederation. Madison's
amendment thus had the benefit of appealing to both sides of the
constitutional controversy.
Second, on a more theoretical level, the compensation clause
served an educative function in that it was to be a "national
declaration of respect for property rights., 214 In essence, the "primary
purpose" of the provision was to "stimulate popular appreciation of
the dangers of expropriation., 215 Indeed, some years later, Chancellor
Kent observed that the Fifth Amendment's compensation clause was
"absolutely decisive of the sense of the people of this country" such
that "a provision for compensation is an indispensable attendant on
the due and constitutional exercise of the power of depriving an
individual of his property.,
216
Finally, far from establishing a new principle, Madison's
amendment did nothing more than incorporate a longstanding
212. Richard Henry Lee, Letters from the Federal Farmer, Letter II, reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 233 (Herbert J. Storing, ed., 1981) (Lee's authorship is
disputed). See also Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case
Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76
CAL. L. REV. 267, 292 (1988) ("Since the federal government is more remote, and more
likely to develop interests separate from and in tension with the people, it is important
that private property not be exposed to confiscation for the benefit of the government.").
213. AMAR, supra note 142, at 287. Although the make-up of the House looked
somewhat better, with an initial allocation of sixty-five members, Patrick Henry noted that
the limitation on representatives contained in the Constitution allowed for a progressively
smaller ratio of representation as the nation increased in size. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 2 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 287 (2d ed., 1888).
214. Treanor, supra note 115, at 714.
215. FISHER, supra note 24, at 101-02.
216. Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 167 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). In
actuality, Kent was confronted with the question of whether a state was required to pay
compensation for a taking of property in the absence of any specific provision in its
constitution.
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principle of property rights into the constitutional text."' In many
respects, it merely reconfirmed the long-held commitment to consent
that was a mainstay of the law of expropriation since the Magna
Carta.
VI."Public Use" as a Limitation on Takings
What, then, of the public use requirement? The short answer is
that no such requirement ever explicitly existed-at least as it has
since been framed by the American judiciary.
In 1789, no provision in either the state or federal constitutions
directly limited takings to "public uses." On the contrary, the
language contained in the various constitutional formulations appears
to be descriptive rather than prescriptive. Certainly, actual practice in
the years leading up to the drafting of the compensation clause
evidenced a belief that private property might be taken to support a
wide range of activities, some of which might arguably be seen as
being only tangentially related to any government function. Thus,
takings of land by private parties for the building of mills or ferries
were thought to be every bit as legitimate a use of the eminent
domain power as takings- to build forts or post offices. This is most
probably because the scope of government regulation in both the
colonial and confederation period was arguably wider than is
commonly thought. Although political economists and others in the
commercial classes frequently called for less government regulation,
few dared to assert that the states lacked the power to regulate the
local economy."8 Consequently, as long as the requirement of
consent was met, takings of property to achieve economic ends were
accomplished without great controversy.
Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that few in the
founding era seem to have thought it necessary to define the phrase,
"public use," as used in the various compensation clauses. On the
contrary, most drafters of early constitutions emphasized the Lockean
notion of representation and effective consent, rather than the
217. But cf. Treanor, supra note 115, at 711-16 (asserting that the Fifth Amendment
helped legitimize the principle of compensation).
218. See, e.g., CATHY D. MATSON & PETER S. ONUF, A UNION OF INTERESTS:
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 37-38 (1990).
Anglo-Americans were no strangers to domestic economic regulation. By 1750
the colonial legislatures had long experience collecting their own revenues,
taxing citizens, operating land banks and paper currencies, distributing land and
arguing over deeds, contracts, riparian rights, and regulating the flow of
inhabitants and goods within their boundaries. The colonial assemblies jealously
defended these privileges.
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substantive aspects of takings. 9  Moreover, the debate over
Madison's proposed amendments to the federal constitution reveals
that most members of Congress were tied up with "due process"
concerns. Both Madison and the various committees charged with
making revisions to the compensation clause seemed always to view
the clause as one in a series of necessary procedural protections for
life, liberty and property. The unstated assumption was simply that
representative government-subject to appropriate procedural
requirements-would be enough to protect against abuses of the
power of eminent domain.
More importantly, it seems clear that the phrase, "public use" as
found in the Fifth Amendment was not meant to serve as a
substantive limitation at all. On the contrary, the term was meant to
be descriptive, rather than prescriptive. It distinguished that category
of takings which required compensation from those that did not.
At the end of the eighteenth century, Anglo-American law
recognized three different types of direct takings. These included
takings by taxation, expropriation and forfeiture. As has been noted
already, takings by taxation or expropriation were based on the
principle of consent and were more properly regarded as "givings."
Forfeitures, on the other hand, were purely involuntary takings, and
were usually imposed as a penalty for violating the law. While most
English theorists agreed that the right to hold property was founded
upon natural law, a man's property might be subject to forfeiture if "a
member of any national community violates the fundamental contract
of his association, by transgressing the municipal law."' 0 In such a
case, "the state may very justly resume that portion of property, or
any part of it, which the laws have before assigned him."'
English law imposed various forfeitures as punishment for
criminal offences. For example, real property belonging to traitors
and capital felons reverted to the Crown upon conviction and
attainder, while in the colonies, heavy fines amounting to total
forfeiture were routinely imposed on felons. Lesser forfeitures were
imposed for minor crimes, particularly in New England, were fines
were imposed for a wider variety of offences, such as failing to attend
church on Sunday, overpaying workers, possessing playing cards or
scolding a husband.m Even after the Revolution, the American states
continued to impose various forfeitures for a variety of "political"
offences. Most states passed laws confiscating the property of
219. Meidinger, supra note 10, at 17.
220. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES **138, 299; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES *11.
221. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *299.
222. MCDONALD, supra note 79, at 20.
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loyalists, while some went so far as to fine those who uttered wicked
opinions.' Forfeiture was not merely a criminal sanction, however.
Enforcement of the trade and navigation acts was only made possible
by the Crown's ability to declare uncustomed goods or vessels used in
smuggling forfeit. Actions for forfeiture might be brought in
personam or in rem, with the result that violations of the revenue or
trade laws might result in both forfeiture of property or fines to the
offenders. 4
As a result, the use of the phrase "public use" in the Fifth
Amendment was most likely designed to ensure compensation when
property was taken for a public use in a manner that imposed a
disproportionate burden on the property owner. Thus, takings by
taxation do not require compensation because the burden of the tax
theoretically falls proportionately on all. Similarly, takings by
forfeiture do not require compensation because forfeitures are
essentially fines imposed for violation of law. Forfeiture is, in effect,
the deprivation of those benefits which are derived from an
observance of the social contract. Requiring compensation for
taxation or forfeiture would defeat the purpose of those exactions.
On the other hand, expropriations require compensation because this
sort of taking imposes a disproportionate burden on the property
owner. Those whose property has been taken for a public purpose, as
in the taking of land for the building of a fort or post office, are asked
to contribute more than their fair share. It is just, therefore, that the
rest of the citizenry make up the loss.
The principle of consent dictates this conclusion. After all, to use
the term "public use" as a limit on the types of cases in which
Congress could expropriate property would be to impose a limit on
the power of Congress to consent on behalf of the people. Such a
limit would have been a monumental alteration in the nature of
representative government as understood by the members of the
founding generation. That is to say, read as a limit on the power of
expropriation, the term "public use" would effectively change the
relationship of Congress as a representative institution to the body
politic, thereby preventing Congress from giving consent in an
important category of cases. This might have been the aim, but there
is simply no evidence that any one in the First Congress understood
223. For example, Virginia enacted a law provided a fine of up to £20,000 and five years
imprisonment against any person who "by any word, or open deed, or act, advisedly and
willingly maintain and defend the authority, jurisdiction, or power, of the king or
parliament of Great Britain, heretofore claimed and exercised within this colony." 9 Va.
Stat. 170 (1776).
224. A fuller discussion of the law of forfeiture in connection with trade and navigation
cases may be found in Matthew P. Harrington, Rethinking In Rem: The Supreme Court's
New (and Misguided) Approach to Civil Forfeiture, 12 YALE L. & POL. REv. 281 (1994).
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that the Fifth Amendment was designed to limit the principle of
consent. Indeed, one would have expected far more debate on so
momentous a question. Moreover, if Congress had really intended
this reading, it might have gone about the business far more directly.
After all, the drafters of the Fifth Amendment might have
accomplished that end simply by declaring that "private property
shall not be taken except for a public use." And, while arguments
from silence are often troublesome, it seems clear that the First
Congress freely made revisions to the amendments as they moved
toward passage.' That no one sought to make clear the limit on
Congress's power to consent is probably the best evidence that no
such limit was intended. As a result, it appears that in proclaiming
that private property shall not be taken for "public use," without just
compensation, the Fifth Amendment merely declares that the
expropriations require compensation while other takings, such as tax
levies or forfeitures, do not.
225. See supra notes 148, 152 and accompanying text concerning the double jeopardy
clause also contained in the Fifth Amendment.

